Question 360In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Bluehaven Backbone 090, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a new customer connectivity turn-up, engineers find: An external BGP session never reaches Established because the local peer definition uses the wrong remote AS. What likely service impact does this condition create? A route loop or false path preference persists due to misdiagnosis. IPv6 customers lose external paths despite healthy IPv4 peering. A false fix redirects a customer subnet onto an inappropriate aggregate route. The interprovider route exchange remains unavailable. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:The interprovider route exchange remains unavailable. Correct the peer autonomous-system setting and validate session negotiation. BGP peers need mutually consistent AS and transport/session parameters. Incorrect Answers A:A route loop or false path preference persists due to misdiagnosis. The choice would be appropriate if an engineer blames BGP route rejection on local preference while a route carries an unexpected autonomous-system path. Here, an external BGP session never reaches Established because the local peer definition uses the wrong remote AS. B:IPv6 customers lose external paths despite healthy IPv4 peering. That option concerns an IPv6 BGP session establishes at TCP level but does not exchange IPv6 reachability because the address family was not enabled. The problem here is different: An external BGP session never reaches Established because the local peer definition uses the wrong remote AS. C:A false fix redirects a customer subnet onto an inappropriate aggregate route. It addresses a different problem: An operator changes route preference to make a broader prefix override a healthy more-specific prefix. Here, an external BGP session never reaches Established because the local peer definition uses the wrong remote AS.
Question 361At fictional Lakewood Carrier 091, a regional service-provider network, during a planned PE-to-core handoff, operations observes: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. Which configuration or operational correction most directly addresses this failure? Correct the import policy term to reject the unauthorized route while preserving contracted prefixes. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Align the peer type and AS settings with the intended same-AS design. Create or correct the routed IRB interface and associate it with the intended VLAN and routing instance. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. Incorrect Answers A:Correct the import policy term to reject the unauthorized route while preserving contracted prefixes. This addresses a situation in which a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy; however, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. C:Align the peer type and AS settings with the intended same-AS design. That option concerns an operator configures an internal route-reflector session as EBGP and introduces an unintended AS boundary. The problem here is different: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:Create or correct the routed IRB interface and associate it with the intended VLAN and routing instance. It addresses a different problem: Customers on a bridged VLAN can exchange Layer 2 frames but cannot reach other subnets because the IRB gateway is absent. Here, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 362At fictional Lakewood Carrier 091, a regional service-provider network, during a planned PE-to-core handoff, operations observes: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. Which Junos forwarding or control-plane rule applies to this case? BGP peers need mutually consistent AS and transport/session parameters. An established BGP session does not by itself establish which received path will be preferred. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. The OSPF router ID uniquely identifies a router in link-state advertisements. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. Incorrect Answers A:BGP peers need mutually consistent AS and transport/session parameters. That relates to circumstances in which an external BGP session never reaches Established because the local peer definition uses the wrong remote AS. Here the problem is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:An established BGP session does not by itself establish which received path will be preferred. This addresses a situation in which a prefix switches BGP best paths and operators cannot explain the result because only peer state is monitored; however, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:The OSPF router ID uniquely identifies a router in link-state advertisements. That option concerns two routers in the same routing domain advertise the same OSPF router ID after cloning a lab template. The problem here is different: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 363At fictional Lakewood Carrier 091, a regional service-provider network, during a planned PE-to-core handoff, operations observes: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. What operational evidence best establishes successful remediation? The BGP session stays Established across a stability window with predictable negotiated timers. The suspect path is explained and only eligible loop-free routes are selected. The expected neighbor appears with stable hold time and correct interface state. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Incorrect Answers A:The BGP session stays Established across a stability window with predictable negotiated timers. It is useful for situations where a neighboring BGP session resets frequently because the timer design is incompatible with observed transport conditions; the reported fault, though, is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:The suspect path is explained and only eligible loop-free routes are selected. That relates to circumstances in which an engineer blames BGP route rejection on local preference while a route carries an unexpected autonomous-system path. Here the problem is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. C:The expected neighbor appears with stable hold time and correct interface state. This addresses a situation in which an IS-IS neighbor remains down after an interface template disables its hello transmission; however, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 364At fictional Lakewood Carrier 091, a regional service-provider network, during a planned PE-to-core handoff, operations observes: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. Which operational harm would persist without the intended correction? Attempts to fix policy distract from a network reachability failure. Traffic engineering decisions depend on a route attribute outside its applicable selection scope. A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. Customers experience a blackhole hidden by otherwise present route advertisements. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Attempts to fix policy distract from a network reachability failure. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Incorrect Answers B:Traffic engineering decisions depend on a route attribute outside its applicable selection scope. It is useful for situations where a network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems; the reported fault, though, is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. C:A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. That relates to circumstances in which a misconfigured customer sends thousands of unintended routes and overwhelms the expected BGP peering scale. Here the problem is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:Customers experience a blackhole hidden by otherwise present route advertisements. This addresses a situation in which a service path references an LSP that is down, but its IP route remains visible in the route table; however, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 365In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Summitfield Carrier 092, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following an audit of service-provider handoff behavior, engineers find: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. What should the Junos specialist change first to resolve this specific fault? Inspect full route attributes and the BGP decision outcome for all candidate paths. Review negotiated hold time and keepalive settings alongside transport health, then correct the design. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Verify renewed label forwarding entries after the IGP path change and correct stale state. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Incorrect Answers A:Inspect full route attributes and the BGP decision outcome for all candidate paths. This could help if a prefix switches BGP best paths and operators cannot explain the result because only peer state is monitored, but not when a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:Review negotiated hold time and keepalive settings alongside transport health, then correct the design. This relates to a case where a neighboring BGP session resets frequently because the timer design is incompatible with observed transport conditions; the current situation is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:Verify renewed label forwarding entries after the IGP path change and correct stale state. That relates to circumstances in which after an IGP reconvergence, an old MPLS label still points to a failed interface on one transit device. Here the problem is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 366In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Summitfield Carrier 092, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following an audit of service-provider handoff behavior, engineers find: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. What technical principle underlies the right remedy? Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. BGP communities label routes for policy decisions only when a policy uses those labels. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. A healthy IS-IS adjacency does not prove the intended shortest path is active in the forwarding plane. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Incorrect Answers A:Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. It is relevant if a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it, but the reported issue is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:BGP communities label routes for policy decisions only when a policy uses those labels. This could help if an upstream advertises a community tag to influence treatment but an import policy ignores the agreed meaning, but not when a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:A healthy IS-IS adjacency does not prove the intended shortest path is active in the forwarding plane. It is useful for situations where the IS-IS session reports established but a core prefix still follows an unexpected path after a circuit metric change; the reported fault, though, is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 367In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Summitfield Carrier 092, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following an audit of service-provider handoff behavior, engineers find: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. Which acceptance finding demonstrates the affected service has recovered? The BGP session stays Established across a stability window with predictable negotiated timers. The chosen path follows documented selection policy with MED considered only where applicable. A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. Peers retain valid routes during a tested restart and withdraw stale state after the appropriate interval. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:A transport test reaches the peer and the BGP state advances to Established. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Incorrect Answers A:The BGP session stays Established across a stability window with predictable negotiated timers. This is applicable when a neighboring BGP session resets frequently because the timer design is incompatible with observed transport conditions; the present condition is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:The chosen path follows documented selection policy with MED considered only where applicable. It is relevant if a network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems, but the reported issue is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. D:Peers retain valid routes during a tested restart and withdraw stale state after the appropriate interval. This relates to a case where a provider assumes graceful restart will work during a routing process restart without considering neighbor support; the current situation is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 368In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Summitfield Carrier 092, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following an audit of service-provider handoff behavior, engineers find: A BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. What is the direct residual network risk if the fault remains unresolved? A supposedly restrictive policy inadvertently advertises internal routes. Undetected route oscillation harms network stability. Repeated flooding and customer frame loss continue despite healthy routes. Attempts to fix policy distract from a network reachability failure. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Attempts to fix policy distract from a network reachability failure. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. BGP depends on working IP transport to establish its TCP session. Incorrect Answers A:A supposedly restrictive policy inadvertently advertises internal routes. That could help when a broad accept term in a BGP policy is evaluated before a specific reject term, letting unwanted routes through; here, a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. B:Undetected route oscillation harms network stability. This is applicable when a prefix switches BGP best paths and operators cannot explain the result because only peer state is monitored; the present condition is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable. C:Repeated flooding and customer frame loss continue despite healthy routes. It is relevant if a MAC moves rapidly among provider ports after a cabling change, yet troubleshooting focuses only on IP routing tables, but the reported issue is that a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable.
Question 369At fictional Brightstone Backbone 093, a regional service-provider network, during a two-site transit migration, operations observes: A provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. Which targeted remediation best fits the reported behavior? Inspect full route attributes and the BGP decision outcome for all candidate paths. Correct the import policy term to reject the unauthorized route while preserving contracted prefixes. Add an explicit approved community match and verify the intended import or export action. Inspect label stack, bottom-of-stack indicator, and the expected transport operation. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Correct the import policy term to reject the unauthorized route while preserving contracted prefixes. BGP import policy governs which learned prefixes enter local route selection. The unauthorized prefix is absent and approved transit routes remain usable. Incorrect Answers A:Inspect full route attributes and the BGP decision outcome for all candidate paths. This could matter when a prefix switches BGP best paths and operators cannot explain the result because only peer state is monitored. In this case, a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. C:Add an explicit approved community match and verify the intended import or export action. This is applicable when an upstream advertises a community tag to influence treatment but an import policy ignores the agreed meaning; the present condition is that a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. D:Inspect label stack, bottom-of-stack indicator, and the expected transport operation. It is relevant if operations assumes a packet is plain IP because the capture display does not decode its MPLS shim header, but the reported issue is that a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy.
Question 370At fictional Brightstone Backbone 093, a regional service-provider network, during a two-site transit migration, operations observes: A provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. Why is this particular correction the best fit for the stated defect? BGP peers use negotiated timers to detect failed sessions and maintain liveness. BGP MED expresses a neighboring AS's ingress preference and its comparison scope is policy-dependent. A tunnel must not rely on its own encapsulated path to reach the outer endpoint. BGP import policy governs which learned prefixes enter local route selection. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:BGP import policy governs which learned prefixes enter local route selection. Correct the import policy term to reject the unauthorized route while preserving contracted prefixes. The unauthorized prefix is absent and approved transit routes remain usable. Incorrect Answers A:BGP peers use negotiated timers to detect failed sessions and maintain liveness. It addresses a different problem: A neighboring BGP session resets frequently because the timer design is incompatible with observed transport conditions. Here, a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. B:BGP MED expresses a neighboring AS's ingress preference and its comparison scope is policy-dependent. This could matter when a network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems. In this case, a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. C:A tunnel must not rely on its own encapsulated path to reach the outer endpoint. That could help when a route to a GRE destination is learned through the same tunnel, creating recursive or looping resolution; here, a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy.