Question 380At fictional Orchard Link 095, a regional service-provider network, during a preproduction design validation, operations observes: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. Which operational harm would persist without the intended correction? Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. Policy and reachability behavior is distorted by a false external session. A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. An unnoticed bridging loop can trigger widespread broadcast storms. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. Incorrect Answers B:Policy and reachability behavior is distorted by a false external session. This is applicable when an operator configures an internal route-reflector session as EBGP and introduces an unintended AS boundary; the present condition is that a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. C:A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. It is relevant if a misconfigured customer sends thousands of unintended routes and overwhelms the expected BGP peering scale, but the reported issue is that a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. D:An unnoticed bridging loop can trigger widespread broadcast storms. This could help if a switch port connecting another bridge is incorrectly marked as an edge port, weakening normal loop-avoidance behavior, but not when a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it.
Question 381In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Oakshore Peering 096, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a maintenance rollback review, engineers find: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. What should the Junos specialist change first to resolve this specific fault? Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. Align the peer type and AS settings with the intended same-AS design. Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Account for GRE and outer-IP overhead and implement a supported MTU or fragmentation strategy. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. The expected customer prefix appears in the advertised-route output and unintended prefixes do not. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. Incorrect Answers B:Align the peer type and AS settings with the intended same-AS design. That could help when an operator configures an internal route-reflector session as EBGP and introduces an unintended AS boundary; here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. C:Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. This is applicable when a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable; the present condition is that a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. D:Account for GRE and outer-IP overhead and implement a supported MTU or fragmentation strategy. It is relevant if large packets fail on an overlay while small probes work because encapsulation overhead exceeds path MTU, but the reported issue is that a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it.
Question 382In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Oakshore Peering 096, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a maintenance rollback review, engineers find: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. What technical principle underlies the right remedy? BGP MED expresses a neighboring AS's ingress preference and its comparison scope is policy-dependent. BGP AS path information supports loop avoidance and participates in route selection. Adding a GRE outer header reduces the effective payload MTU available to the inner packet. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. The expected customer prefix appears in the advertised-route output and unintended prefixes do not. Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. Incorrect Answers A:BGP MED expresses a neighboring AS's ingress preference and its comparison scope is policy-dependent. It addresses a different problem: A network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems. Here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. B:BGP AS path information supports loop avoidance and participates in route selection. This could matter when an engineer blames BGP route rejection on local preference while a route carries an unexpected autonomous-system path. In this case, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. C:Adding a GRE outer header reduces the effective payload MTU available to the inner packet. That could help when large packets fail on an overlay while small probes work because encapsulation overhead exceeds path MTU; here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it.
Question 383In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Oakshore Peering 096, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a maintenance rollback review, engineers find: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. Which acceptance finding demonstrates the affected service has recovered? The expected customer prefix appears in the advertised-route output and unintended prefixes do not. The unauthorized prefix is absent and approved transit routes remain usable. The source of withdrawals is identified and the prefix stays available during observation. Packet observations match the intended push, swap, and disposition stages. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:The expected customer prefix appears in the advertised-route output and unintended prefixes do not. Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. Incorrect Answers B:The unauthorized prefix is absent and approved transit routes remain usable. It addresses a different problem: A provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. Here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. C:The source of withdrawals is identified and the prefix stays available during observation. This could matter when an upstream prefix repeatedly withdraws and returns but the operations view shows only the current best route. In this case, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. D:Packet observations match the intended push, swap, and disposition stages. That could help when a network test expects the ingress PE to swap a label that it should actually impose; here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it.
Question 384In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Oakshore Peering 096, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a maintenance rollback review, engineers find: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. What is the direct residual network risk if the fault remains unresolved? Unwanted routes may alter forwarding or create customer traffic leakage. A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. Healthy MPLS transport is disrupted by a false fault diagnosis. Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. Fix the peer export policy match for the authorized prefix and verify the announced routes. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. Incorrect Answers A:Unwanted routes may alter forwarding or create customer traffic leakage. The choice would be appropriate if a provider receives a customer-only prefix from a transit peer that should be blocked by an import policy. Here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. B:A route leak consumes routing resources and destabilizes production services. That option concerns a misconfigured customer sends thousands of unintended routes and overwhelms the expected BGP peering scale. The problem here is different: A customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. C:Healthy MPLS transport is disrupted by a false fault diagnosis. It addresses a different problem: An operator sees the transport label removed near the egress and flags a failure despite the design allowing PHP. Here, a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it.
Question 385At fictional Brookridge Metro 097, a regional service-provider network, during a core-routing acceptance test, operations observes: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. Which targeted remediation best fits the reported behavior? Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. Place precise deny/accept logic in the intended evaluation order and validate policy results. Confirm MED comparison applicability and use a suitable local outbound policy if needed. Use passive OSPF operation on the customer-facing interface while retaining intended prefix advertisement. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. Incorrect Answers B:Place precise deny/accept logic in the intended evaluation order and validate policy results. The choice would be appropriate if a broad accept term in a BGP policy is evaluated before a specific reject term, letting unwanted routes through. Here, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. C:Confirm MED comparison applicability and use a suitable local outbound policy if needed. That option concerns a network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems. The problem here is different: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. D:Use passive OSPF operation on the customer-facing interface while retaining intended prefix advertisement. It addresses a different problem: A provider PE inadvertently attempts to form an OSPF adjacency on a customer LAN that should advertise reachability only. Here, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.
Question 386At fictional Brookridge Metro 097, a regional service-provider network, during a core-routing acceptance test, operations observes: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. Why is this particular correction the best fit for the stated defect? BGP route stability depends on both peer health and consistent route advertisements. An established BGP session does not by itself establish which received path will be preferred. IS-IS hello PDUs discover and maintain neighbor relationships. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. Incorrect Answers A:BGP route stability depends on both peer health and consistent route advertisements. That relates to circumstances in which an upstream prefix repeatedly withdraws and returns but the operations view shows only the current best route. Here the problem is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. B:An established BGP session does not by itself establish which received path will be preferred. This addresses a situation in which a prefix switches BGP best paths and operators cannot explain the result because only peer state is monitored; however, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. C:IS-IS hello PDUs discover and maintain neighbor relationships. The choice would be appropriate if an IS-IS neighbor remains down after an interface template disables its hello transmission. Here, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.
Question 387At fictional Brookridge Metro 097, a regional service-provider network, during a core-routing acceptance test, operations observes: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. What direct observation would prove the corrective action worked? Tagged prefixes receive the documented policy action and untagged routes are unaffected. The chosen path follows documented selection policy with MED considered only where applicable. The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. An injected test BPDU triggers the documented protection while legitimate access ports behave normally. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. Incorrect Answers A:Tagged prefixes receive the documented policy action and untagged routes are unaffected. It is useful for situations where an upstream advertises a community tag to influence treatment but an import policy ignores the agreed meaning; the reported fault, though, is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. B:The chosen path follows documented selection policy with MED considered only where applicable. That relates to circumstances in which a network expects MED to control all outbound peer choices even when comparing routes learned from unrelated neighboring autonomous systems. Here the problem is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. D:An injected test BPDU triggers the documented protection while legitimate access ports behave normally. The choice would be appropriate if a subscriber accidentally connects a switch that sends BPDUs into a provider edge expected to accept endpoints only. Here, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.
Question 388At fictional Brookridge Metro 097, a regional service-provider network, during a core-routing acceptance test, operations observes: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. Which failure consequence follows most closely from ignoring this issue? IPv6 customers lose external paths despite healthy IPv4 peering. Services remain blackholed despite a received BGP update. Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. A single member fault causes a complete customer circuit outage. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Services remain blackholed despite a received BGP update. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. Incorrect Answers A:IPv6 customers lose external paths despite healthy IPv4 peering. This relates to a case where an IPv6 BGP session establishes at TCP level but does not exchange IPv6 reachability because the address family was not enabled; the current situation is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. C:Remote networks cannot reach the customer or a broad policy leaks infrastructure routes. That relates to circumstances in which a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it. Here the problem is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. D:A single member fault causes a complete customer circuit outage. This addresses a situation in which a provider assumes a two-member LAG is redundant but has never checked forwarding when one member fails; however, an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.
Question 389In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Stonefield Telecom 098, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a monitored network change window, engineers find: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. What intervention most directly restores the intended routing or switching behavior? Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. Restore deliberate local-preference assignment and check selected egress paths. Synchronize the approved IS-IS authentication configuration across peers and verify secure adjacency. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. Incorrect Answers A:Repair transport routing and source-address selection before modifying BGP policy. This could help if a BGP peer has a correct AS number but cannot connect because its TCP transport address is unreachable, but not when an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. C:Restore deliberate local-preference assignment and check selected egress paths. It is useful for situations where a customer AS should prefer a primary exit but its IBGP paths have the same local preference after a policy reset; the reported fault, though, is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. D:Synchronize the approved IS-IS authentication configuration across peers and verify secure adjacency. That relates to circumstances in which a provider IS-IS circuit stops forming neighbors after the authentication key is changed on only one end. Here the problem is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.
Question 390In a separate fictional JNCIS-SP lab review for Stonefield Telecom 098, a carrier-edge and core routing team, following a monitored network change window, engineers find: An IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. Which networking principle explains why the proposed correction is appropriate? BGP address-family negotiation determines which network-layer reachability data can be exchanged. Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. Junos directly connected reachability depends on active logical interface configuration and state. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:A BGP path cannot be installed for forwarding when its next hop cannot be resolved. The BGP route becomes active and the next hop resolves to a reachable core interface. Make the BGP next hop reachable through the designed IGP or appropriate next-hop policy. Incorrect Answers A:BGP address-family negotiation determines which network-layer reachability data can be exchanged. It is relevant if an IPv6 BGP session establishes at TCP level but does not exchange IPv6 reachability because the address family was not enabled, but the reported issue is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. B:Junos BGP exports only routes accepted by the applicable export policy. This could help if a customer prefix is not advertised to an upstream peer because the outbound routing policy does not permit it, but not when an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability. D:Junos directly connected reachability depends on active logical interface configuration and state. It is useful for situations where a directly connected peering subnet disappears after a logical interface unit is removed during a maintenance template rollout; the reported fault, though, is that an IBGP-learned external prefix is present but inactive because the advertised next-hop address has no IGP reachability.