Question 950A customer-support service account can export all user data even though its only function is to read ticket status. Which technical or governance distinction underlies this finding? Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The practical correction is to reduce its permissions to the exact api operations and data required. Other Answers A:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. C:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles.
Question 951A customer-support service account can export all user data even though its only function is to read ticket status. What would be the strongest operating-effectiveness evidence? Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications. Compare current job duties and approved role assignments for sampled transfers. Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers A:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. D:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial.
Question 952A customer-support service account can export all user data even though its only function is to read ticket status. What preventive governance change should be embedded in the process? Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. Trigger access review on employee job changes as well as departure. Inventory and automate lifecycle termination of user-associated sessions and secrets. Review machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change. B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change. C:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change.
Question 953A terminated employee's SSO login is disabled, but active API tokens and SaaS sessions continue working. Which response best resolves this finding without expanding unrelated scope? Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. Revoke inherited privileges and recertify entitlements for the new job function. Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required. Revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. The confirming audit procedure is: Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications. Other Answers A:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding. B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding. C:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding.
Question 954A terminated employee's SSO login is disabled, but active API tokens and SaaS sessions continue working. Which explanation best accounts for the audit exposure? Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. The practical correction is to revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding. Other Answers B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. C:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. D:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions.
Question 955A terminated employee's SSO login is disabled, but active API tokens and SaaS sessions continue working. Which test would MOST directly establish that the specific weakness is resolved? Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. Compare current job duties and approved role assignments for sampled transfers. Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications. Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers A:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications. B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications. D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. This does not establish the required evidence: Test token use after termination and inspect revocation logs across applications.
Question 956A terminated employee's SSO login is disabled, but active API tokens and SaaS sessions continue working. What should be made routine to keep this exact failure from returning? Examine machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change. Trigger access review on employee job changes as well as departure. Inventory and automate lifecycle termination of user-associated sessions and secrets. Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Inventory and automate lifecycle termination of user-associated sessions and secrets. B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Inventory and automate lifecycle termination of user-associated sessions and secrets. D:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Inventory and automate lifecycle termination of user-associated sessions and secrets.
Question 957A company segments application servers but allows employee laptops to administer databases directly over the same network. Which audit recommendation MOST directly addresses the particular gap? Define egress restrictions based on approved destination and service needs. Verify endpoint protection health and update currency, not installation presence alone. Apply compensating isolation, monitored access and an approved lifecycle remediation plan. Restrict management paths to approved jump services and privileged administrative networks. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. The confirming audit procedure is: Attempt unauthorized database management from a user endpoint and verify blocking and logs. Other Answers A:Redundant devices improve availability, not automatically the confidentiality of outbound flows. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Restrict management paths to approved jump services and privileged administrative networks. B:Deployed agents may provide ineffective protection when their rules or services are stale. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Restrict management paths to approved jump services and privileged administrative networks. C:Unsupported endpoint controls warrant layered safeguards matched to operational constraints. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Restrict management paths to approved jump services and privileged administrative networks.
Question 958A company segments application servers but allows employee laptops to administer databases directly over the same network. What principle best explains the auditor’s concern in this case? Deployed agents may provide ineffective protection when their rules or services are stale. A shared key cannot reliably identify and revoke a single departing user. Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. Redundant devices improve availability, not automatically the confidentiality of outbound flows. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. The practical correction is to restrict management paths to approved jump services and privileged administrative networks. Other Answers A:Deployed agents may provide ineffective protection when their rules or services are stale. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. B:A shared key cannot reliably identify and revoke a single departing user. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. D:Redundant devices improve availability, not automatically the confidentiality of outbound flows. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic.
Question 959A company segments application servers but allows employee laptops to administer databases directly over the same network. Which independently checked result is most relevant to the issue? Attempt an unauthorized destination connection and inspect firewall denial. Attempt unauthorized database management from a user endpoint and verify blocking and logs. Test unauthorized office-to-device reachability and approved maintenance access. Inspect agent signature age and simulate a safe detection test. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers A:Redundant devices improve availability, not automatically the confidentiality of outbound flows. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt unauthorized database management from a user endpoint and verify blocking and logs. C:Unsupported endpoint controls warrant layered safeguards matched to operational constraints. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt unauthorized database management from a user endpoint and verify blocking and logs. D:Deployed agents may provide ineffective protection when their rules or services are stale. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt unauthorized database management from a user endpoint and verify blocking and logs.
Question 960A company segments application servers but allows employee laptops to administer databases directly over the same network. Which change-control rule best reduces repeat occurrences? Monitor protection update and sensor-health exceptions centrally. Review high-risk network egress policy against data-flow inventories. Review east-west and management-plane firewall rules for least privilege. Reassess legacy endpoint exceptions and segment exposure continuously. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Network segmentation must include administrative paths, not just application traffic. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Deployed agents may provide ineffective protection when their rules or services are stale. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review east-west and management-plane firewall rules for least privilege. B:Redundant devices improve availability, not automatically the confidentiality of outbound flows. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review east-west and management-plane firewall rules for least privilege. D:Unsupported endpoint controls warrant layered safeguards matched to operational constraints. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Review east-west and management-plane firewall rules for least privilege.