Question 940A cloud console uses shared administrator passwords, preventing attribution of sensitive configuration changes. Which lifecycle measure would best maintain the corrected condition? Require individual administrative identities and regular role recertification. Rotate the shared cloud administrator password monthly without assigning individual administrator identities. Trigger access review on employee job changes as well as departure. Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers B:Periodic rotation does not provide per-user attribution for privileged actions performed under a shared account. C:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Require individual administrative identities and regular role recertification. D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Require individual administrative identities and regular role recertification.
Question 941A password reset desk relies only on a caller's employee number, which is widely available within the organization. Which audit conclusion most directly drives a practical correction? Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. Apply named identities with least privilege and protected privileged-session evidence. Revoke inherited privileges and recertify entitlements for the new job function. Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. The confirming audit procedure is: Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. Other Answers B:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. C:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. D:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors.
Question 942A password reset desk relies only on a caller's employee number, which is widely available within the organization. Why does the described condition create the stated control weakness? Access rights ought to follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. The practical correction is to introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. Other Answers A:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. C:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity.
Question 943A password reset desk relies only on a caller's employee number, which is widely available within the organization. Which evidence should a reviewer seek before accepting remediation? Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. Cross-check current job duties and approved role assignments for sampled transfers. Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. Trace a test privileged change to one authenticated operator and approval. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers B:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. C:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. D:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. This does not establish the required evidence: Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints.
Question 944A password reset desk relies only on a caller's employee number, which is widely available within the organization. Which standard practice would most specifically protect the result? Trigger access review on employee job changes as well as departure. Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. Require individual administrative identities and regular role recertification. Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance. B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance. C:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance.
Question 945A finance application requires two-factor authentication, but emergency access accounts bypass the policy indefinitely. Which audit recommendation MOST directly addresses the particular gap? Revoke inherited privileges and recertify entitlements for the new job function. Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required. Introduce robust identity verification before resetting authentication factors. Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The confirming audit procedure is: Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. Other Answers A:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. B:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. C:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls.
Question 946A finance application requires two-factor authentication, but emergency access accounts bypass the policy indefinitely. What principle best explains the auditor’s concern in this case? Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The practical correction is to constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. Other Answers A:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. C:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. D:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use.
Question 947A finance application requires two-factor authentication, but emergency access accounts bypass the policy indefinitely. Which independently checked result is most relevant to the issue? Compare current job duties and approved role assignments for sampled transfers. Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. Attempt a simulated unauthorized reset and inspect verification checkpoints. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers A:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. C:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. This does not establish the required evidence: Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review. D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. This does not establish the required evidence: Review sampled emergency sessions for justification, time limits and post-use review.
Question 948A finance application requires two-factor authentication, but emergency access accounts bypass the policy indefinitely. Which change-control rule best reduces repeat occurrences? Trigger access review on employee job changes as well as departure. Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. Review machine-identity entitlements whenever integrations change. Test account recovery procedures for social-engineering resistance. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. C:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule. D:Knowledge of a low-entropy identifier does not establish the requester's identity. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials and recertify their necessity on schedule.
Question 949A customer-support service account can export all user data even though its only function is to read ticket status. Which action MOST specifically remedies the observed control weakness? Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required. Constrain emergency access, log each use and apply equivalent compensating controls. Revoke sessions, tokens and downstream access through complete offboarding. Revoke inherited privileges and recertify entitlements for the new job function. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The confirming audit procedure is: Attempt an out-of-scope export with the service identity and verify denial. Other Answers B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required. C:Federated login disablement may not terminate existing noninteractive credentials or sessions. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required. D:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Reduce its permissions to the exact API operations and data required.
Question 950A customer-support service account can export all user data even though its only function is to read ticket status. Which technical or governance distinction underlies this finding? Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. The practical correction is to reduce its permissions to the exact api operations and data required. Other Answers A:Shared accounts weaken accountability and make inappropriate activity harder to investigate. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. B:Break-glass capabilities carry heightened risk and need tightly controlled exception use. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles. C:Access rights should follow current business need rather than accumulate across roles. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Service identities must be constrained by function, not given broad human-style roles.