Question 1020An application uses a homegrown cipher scheme without peer review for sensitive payment records. What ongoing monitoring or approval control matches this weakness? Require strict TLS identity validation in approved clients and integrations. Enforce full-media encryption before approved sensitive data export. Standardize approved algorithms, libraries and key management procedures. Enforce key custody, rotation and independent access reviews. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Security depends on sound cryptographic design and implementation, not secrecy of custom code. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Encryption without authenticating the peer can still permit interception by an impostor. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Standardize approved algorithms, libraries and key management procedures. B:Transport encryption does not protect stored copies after they leave the network. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Standardize approved algorithms, libraries and key management procedures. D:Encryption is undermined when ciphertext and keys share the same compromised trust boundary. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Standardize approved algorithms, libraries and key management procedures.
Question 1021A browser trusts a corporate portal certificate although the hostname differs from the portal being accessed. Which change would most directly lower the identified risk? Separate certificates and keys by intended usage and trust policy. Move CA private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery. Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. Deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The confirming audit procedure is: Connect using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain. Other Answers A:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. B:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. D:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client.
Question 1022A browser trusts a corporate portal certificate although the hostname differs from the portal being accessed. Which causal interpretation is the most defensible? Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The practical correction is to correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. Other Answers A:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. B:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. C:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name.
Question 1023A browser trusts a corporate portal certificate although the hostname differs from the portal being accessed. Which audit procedure most directly verifies the stated requirement? Connect using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain. Attempt authentication with a revoked test certificate and verify denial. Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence. Inspect enhanced key usage and verify clients reject unsuitable certificates. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers B:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. This does not establish the required evidence: Connect using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain. C:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. This does not establish the required evidence: Connect using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain. D:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. This does not establish the required evidence: Connect using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain.
Question 1024A browser trusts a corporate portal certificate although the hostname differs from the portal being accessed. Which lifecycle measure would best maintain the corrected condition? Enforce purpose-specific issuance profiles and certificate inventory. Require independent authorization and protected key storage for CA operations. Maintain controlled CA rollover and trust-store distribution procedures. Audit certificate names and trust validation in application acceptance tests. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Audit certificate names and trust validation in application acceptance tests. B:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Audit certificate names and trust validation in application acceptance tests. C:A valid new certificate is unusable where clients do not trust its issuing chain. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Audit certificate names and trust validation in application acceptance tests.
Question 1025A critical internal CA's private signing key is backed up to an unsecured shared drive. Which audit conclusion most directly drives a practical correction? Separate certificates and keys by intended usage and trust policy. Move CA private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery. Plan trust-anchor migration and validate client compatibility before cutover. Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. The confirming audit procedure is: Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence. Other Answers A:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Move CA private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery. C:A valid new certificate is unusable where clients do not trust its issuing chain. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Move CA private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery. D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Move CA private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery.
Question 1026A critical internal CA's private signing key is backed up to an unsecured shared drive. Why does the described condition create the stated control weakness? Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. Distinct certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. The practical correction is to move ca private keys to appropriately protected cryptographic custody with controlled recovery. Other Answers B:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. C:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign.
Question 1027A critical internal CA's private signing key is backed up to an unsecured shared drive. Which evidence should a reviewer seek before accepting remediation? Connect securely using a mismatched hostname and verify the client rejects the chain. Inspect enhanced key usage and verify clients reject unsuitable certificates. Attempt authentication with a revoked test certificate and verify denial. Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. The selected test checks this actual control outcome rather than merely related configuration. Other Answers A:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. This does not establish the required evidence: Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence. B:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. This does not establish the required evidence: Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence. C:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. This does not establish the required evidence: Inspect key access controls and review recovery procedure evidence.
Question 1028A critical internal CA's private signing key is backed up to an unsecured shared drive. Which standard practice would most specifically protect the result? Audit certificate names and trust validation in application acceptance tests. Require independent authorization and protected key storage for CA operations. Enforce purpose-specific issuance profiles and certificate inventory. Test revocation distribution and validation paths periodically. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Compromise of a trust anchor threatens every certificate it can sign. The safeguard makes this specific requirement part of ongoing governance rather than a one-time fix. Other Answers A:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Require independent authorization and protected key storage for CA operations. C:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Require independent authorization and protected key storage for CA operations. D:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. For this specific failure, the relevant preventive control is: Require independent authorization and protected key storage for CA operations.
Question 1029An employee certificate is revoked for compromise, but clients never check revocation status and continue trusting it. Which audit recommendation MOST directly addresses the particular gap? Deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials. Plan trust-anchor migration and validate client compatibility before cutover. Separate certificates and keys by intended usage and trust policy. Correct the certificate identity and enforce hostname verification in the client. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. The confirming audit procedure is: Attempt authentication with a revoked test certificate and verify denial. Other Answers B:A valid new certificate is unusable where clients do not trust its issuing chain. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials. C:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials. D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. For the stated failure, the appropriate corrective action is: Deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials.
Question 1030An employee certificate is revoked for compromise, but clients never check revocation status and continue trusting it. What principle best explains the auditor’s concern in this case? Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. A valid new certificate is unusable where clients do not trust its issuing chain. A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. The practical correction is to deploy effective revocation checking or suitably controlled short-lived credentials. Other Answers B:Different certificate purposes have different privileges, lifecycles and compromise consequences. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. C:A valid new certificate is unusable where clients do not trust its issuing chain. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted. D:A valid signature alone does not bind a certificate to the intended service name. The risk in this scenario follows a different principle: Certificates can remain mathematically valid after their owner or key is no longer trusted.