Question 530An application whitelisting policy identifies software only by filename and permits an unsigned binary renamed to match a trusted tool. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident? Combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions. Require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists. Maintain sanctioned cloud storage inventory and data exfiltration response playbooks. Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. This safeguard limits repeat failures because a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The direct correction remains: Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control. Other Answers A:OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. B:MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. C:TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.
Question 531A contractor's managed workstation passes OS patch compliance but runs unauthorized remote desktop software capable of external data transfer. Which security change most directly addresses the specific failure? Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone. Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control. Restrict SSH/SCP egress to approved management destinations and inspect relevant host transfer evidence. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. This action specifically works because oS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. Verify with: Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. Other Answers B:MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. A more relevant action is to enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. C:A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The corrective action for this requirement is to enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. D:A permitted management protocol can also carry unauthorized file transfers when destination scope is too broad. The corrective action for this requirement is to enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope.
Question 532A contractor's managed workstation passes OS patch compliance but runs unauthorized remote desktop software capable of external data transfer. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition? MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. A permitted management protocol can also carry unauthorized file transfers when destination scope is too broad. OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. The practical corrective action is: Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. Confirm it by: Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. Other Answers A:MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. By contrast, OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. B:A permitted management protocol can also carry unauthorized file transfers when destination scope is too broad. By contrast, OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. D:A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. By contrast, OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user.
Question 533A contractor's managed workstation passes OS patch compliance but runs unauthorized remote desktop software capable of external data transfer. What should the team check before closing this issue? Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone. Correlate test SCP traffic with destination allowlists and endpoint file access records. Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it. Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. The evidence confirms the intended action: Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. It matters because oS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. Other Answers A:MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. Proving this correction calls for a check to attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. B:A permitted management protocol can also carry unauthorized file transfers when destination scope is too broad. A more meaningful verification is to attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record. C:A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. A more meaningful verification is to attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record.
Question 534A contractor's managed workstation passes OS patch compliance but runs unauthorized remote desktop software capable of external data transfer. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident? Combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions. Require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists. Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. Define outbound management-protocol egress policy and alert on unusual remote file copy volumes. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions. This safeguard limits repeat failures because oS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. The direct correction remains: Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope. Other Answers B:MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. The lasting safeguard is to combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions. C:A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The stronger recurring control is to combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions. D:A permitted management protocol can also carry unauthorized file transfers when destination scope is too broad. The stronger recurring control is to combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions.
Question 535An ISE-managed access switch uses MAB only for all clients despite employee laptops supporting certificate-based 802.1X. Which security change most directly addresses the specific failure? Correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. Register or profile the camera and return a limited camera-specific authorization result instead of permissive default access. Use constrained device profiling and an approved MAB policy for the known medical appliance class. Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. This action specifically works because certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. Verify with: Connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. Other Answers A:Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. This failure calls for a decision to configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. B:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. A more relevant action is to configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. C:Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. The required change instead is to configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it.
Question 536An ISE-managed access switch uses MAB only for all clients despite employee laptops supporting certificate-based 802.1X. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition? Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. Certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. The practical corrective action is: Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. Confirm it by: Connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. Other Answers A:Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. In the stated system, certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. B:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. By contrast, certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. D:Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. By contrast, certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone.
Question 537An ISE-managed access switch uses MAB only for all clients despite employee laptops supporting certificate-based 802.1X. What should the team check before closing this issue? Trace the live ISE authentication record to the selected authorization profile and switch session attributes. Connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. Connect a registered camera and an unknown spoofed MAC and compare their access decisions. Compare allowed appliance traffic with a spoofed unregistered MAC and verify expected policy distinctions. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. The evidence confirms the intended action: Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. It matters because certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. Other Answers A:Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. A more meaningful verification is to connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. C:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. The failure is checked more directly by a test to connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile. D:Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. The relevant acceptance check is to connect an enrolled laptop and a legacy printer and inspect the distinct method and assigned authorization profile.
Question 538An ISE-managed access switch uses MAB only for all clients despite employee laptops supporting certificate-based 802.1X. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident? Maintain separate 802.1X and MAB policies with least-privilege fallback and profiling. Enforce deny-or-quarantine defaults for unknown endpoints and review MAB exceptions. Test role-based authorization priorities after every policy rule change. Inventory non-802.1X device identities and apply limited authorization with monitoring. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Maintain separate 802.1X and MAB policies with least-privilege fallback and profiling. This safeguard limits repeat failures because certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. The direct correction remains: Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. Other Answers B:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. The stronger recurring control is to maintain separate 802.1X and MAB policies with least-privilege fallback and profiling. C:Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. A more direct preventive measure is to maintain separate 802.1X and MAB policies with least-privilege fallback and profiling. D:Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. The lasting safeguard is to maintain separate 802.1X and MAB policies with least-privilege fallback and profiling.
Question 539A wired 802.1X client authenticates successfully against Cisco ISE but receives the quarantine VLAN instead of the production network. Which security change most directly addresses the specific failure? Trigger supported Change of Authorization to reevaluate or terminate the active session after identity changes. Correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. Register or profile the camera and return a limited camera-specific authorization result instead of permissive default access. Configure 802.1X as the preferred authenticated method with constrained MAB fallback for devices that require it. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. This action specifically works because authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. Verify with: Trace the live ISE authentication record to the selected authorization profile and switch session attributes. Other Answers A:CoA lets policy changes affect an established network access session without relying on physical reconnection. The required change instead is to correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. C:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. This failure calls for a decision to correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. D:Certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. A more relevant action is to correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity.
Question 540A wired 802.1X client authenticates successfully against Cisco ISE but receives the quarantine VLAN instead of the production network. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition? Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. CoA lets policy changes affect an established network access session without relying on physical reconnection. Certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. The practical corrective action is: Correct the matching ISE authorization rule and returned VLAN/SGT attributes for the verified identity. Confirm it by: Trace the live ISE authentication record to the selected authorization profile and switch session attributes. Other Answers B:MAB offers weak device evidence and must be paired with limited network permissions and inventory context. In the stated system, authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. C:CoA lets policy changes affect an established network access session without relying on physical reconnection. By contrast, authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions. D:Certificate-based 802.1X offers stronger user/device authentication than forgeable MAC identity alone. By contrast, authentication acceptance does not ensure the correct authorization result is selected by policy ordering and conditions.