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Cisco 350-701 Bundle

Exam Code: 350-701

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Security Core Technologies

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Security , CCNP Security

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Cisco 350-701 Practice Test 53

Question 520

A personal laptop gains BYOD network access but a certificate installer grants it permanent trust without rechecking device posture. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition?

  1. A correct password is not sufficient evidence of trusted user presence and device safety in zero-trust access.
  2. Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.
  3. Guest authentication establishes visitor identity but does not justify unrestricted internal network privileges.
  4. Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. The practical corrective action is: Separate BYOD enrollment from ongoing posture-based authorization with expiring device credentials. Confirm it by: Test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.

Other Answers

A:

A correct password is not sufficient evidence of trusted user presence and device safety in zero-trust access. In the stated system, device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.

C:

Guest authentication establishes visitor identity but does not justify unrestricted internal network privileges. In the stated system, device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.

D:

Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. In the stated system, device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.

Question 521

A personal laptop gains BYOD network access but a certificate installer grants it permanent trust without rechecking device posture. What should the team check before closing this issue?

  1. Compare allowed appliance traffic with a spoofed unregistered MAC and verify expected policy distinctions.
  2. Test compliant and untrusted devices with the same authorized user and compare Duo policy outcomes.
  3. Test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.
  4. Test guest credentials against internet access and protected engineering servers and inspect authorization logs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent. The evidence confirms the intended action: Separate BYOD enrollment from ongoing posture-based authorization with expiring device credentials. It matters because device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.

Other Answers

A:

Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. The failure is checked more directly by a test to test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.

B:

A correct password is not sufficient evidence of trusted user presence and device safety in zero-trust access. The failure is checked more directly by a test to test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.

D:

Guest authentication establishes visitor identity but does not justify unrestricted internal network privileges. The failure is checked more directly by a test to test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.

Question 522

A personal laptop gains BYOD network access but a certificate installer grants it permanent trust without rechecking device posture. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident?

  1. Inventory non-802.1X device identities and apply limited authorization with monitoring.
  2. Set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices.
  3. Review adaptive access and device trust thresholds after platform updates.
  4. Review guest account expiry, sponsor approval and isolation policy for every onboarding process.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices. This safeguard limits repeat failures because device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. The direct correction remains: Separate BYOD enrollment from ongoing posture-based authorization with expiring device credentials.

Other Answers

A:

Profiling supplies contextual endpoint classification but does not make MAC addresses strong identity secrets. The stronger recurring control is to set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices.

C:

A correct password is not sufficient evidence of trusted user presence and device safety in zero-trust access. The stronger recurring control is to set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices.

D:

Guest authentication establishes visitor identity but does not justify unrestricted internal network privileges. The stronger recurring control is to set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices.

Question 523

A corporate handset is registered with MDM but its encryption flag turns off while the app remains authorized to open client records. Which security change most directly addresses the specific failure?

  1. Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.
  2. Separate BYOD enrollment from ongoing posture-based authorization with expiring device credentials.
  3. Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.
  4. Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone. This action specifically works because mDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. Verify with: Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.

Other Answers

A:

A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The required change instead is to enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.

B:

Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. The corrective action for this requirement is to enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.

D:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. This failure calls for a decision to enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.

Question 524

A corporate handset is registered with MDM but its encryption flag turns off while the app remains authorized to open client records. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition?

  1. MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.
  2. Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation.
  3. OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user.
  4. A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. The practical corrective action is: Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone. Confirm it by: Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.

Other Answers

B:

Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. By contrast, MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.

C:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. In the stated system, MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.

D:

A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. In the stated system, MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.

Question 525

A corporate handset is registered with MDM but its encryption flag turns off while the app remains authorized to open client records. What should the team check before closing this issue?

  1. Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.
  2. Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.
  3. Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record.
  4. Test a compliant BYOD laptop before and after disabling its required security agent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone. The evidence confirms the intended action: Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone. It matters because mDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.

Other Answers

A:

A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The failure is checked more directly by a test to verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.

C:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. The relevant acceptance check is to verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.

D:

Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. A more meaningful verification is to verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.

Question 526

A corporate handset is registered with MDM but its encryption flag turns off while the app remains authorized to open client records. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident?

  1. Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.
  2. Require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists.
  3. Set credential lifetimes and repeated posture evaluation for personal devices.
  4. Combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists. This safeguard limits repeat failures because mDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. The direct correction remains: Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.

Other Answers

A:

A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. Reducing this risk requires a practice to require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists.

C:

Device ownership and posture can change; one-time enrollment is not a permanent health attestation. The lasting safeguard is to require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists.

D:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. The stronger recurring control is to require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists.

Question 527

An application whitelisting policy identifies software only by filename and permits an unsigned binary renamed to match a trusted tool. Which security change most directly addresses the specific failure?

  1. Apply approved cloud destination and DLP controls and correlate endpoint identity with upload patterns.
  2. Enforce both posture requirements and application-control restrictions tied to contractor access scope.
  3. Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.
  4. Enforce compliant-device checks at application access and block or remediate the noncompliant phone.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control. This action specifically works because a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. Verify with: Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

Other Answers

A:

TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized. This failure calls for a decision to authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.

B:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. This failure calls for a decision to authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.

D:

MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. This failure calls for a decision to authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.

Question 528

An application whitelisting policy identifies software only by filename and permits an unsigned binary renamed to match a trusted tool. Why does that solution fit the observed security condition?

  1. A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.
  2. TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized.
  3. MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state.
  4. OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The practical corrective action is: Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control. Confirm it by: Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

Other Answers

B:

TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized. In the stated system, a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.

C:

MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. In the stated system, a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.

D:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. In the stated system, a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.

Question 529

An application whitelisting policy identifies software only by filename and permits an unsigned binary renamed to match a trusted tool. What should the team check before closing this issue?

  1. Verify the same user is allowed on an encrypted device and denied on the noncompliant test phone.
  2. Attempt the unauthorized remote tool and inspect the specific deny and audit record.
  3. Replay a synthetic sensitive-data upload and confirm user, destination and data classification appear in alerts.
  4. Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it. The evidence confirms the intended action: Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control. It matters because a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness.

Other Answers

A:

MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. Proving this correction calls for a check to run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

B:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. Proving this correction calls for a check to run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

C:

TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized. Proving this correction calls for a check to run the renamed unsigned test binary and confirm the application-control policy blocks it.

Question 530

An application whitelisting policy identifies software only by filename and permits an unsigned binary renamed to match a trusted tool. Which preventive practice best follows from this incident?

  1. Combine device posture, software inventory and role-based application restrictions.
  2. Require risk-aware compliance rules and scheduled check-ins rather than static device lists.
  3. Maintain sanctioned cloud storage inventory and data exfiltration response playbooks.
  4. Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates. This safeguard limits repeat failures because a filename is a mutable label and cannot prove executable identity or trustworthiness. The direct correction remains: Authorize signed publishers, approved hashes or managed packages instead of filename-only application control.

Other Answers

A:

OS health does not establish that every application on the endpoint is sanctioned for that user. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.

B:

MDM enrollment identifies management scope but device compliance is a separate policy state. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.

C:

TLS encryption protects transit but does not prove that the destination or uploaded data is authorized. A more direct preventive measure is to review allowed software identities and signature validation after application updates.