Question 160An unauthorized DHCP server connected at a conference room port hands users an attacker-controlled DNS and default router. What should be institutionalized before future deployments? Audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. Maintain trusted uplink design and DHCP binding persistence across switch reloads. Apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches. Review application discovery logs before expanding access rules. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. This safeguard limits repeat failures because dHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. The direct correction remains: Use DHCP snooping with the uplink marked trusted and guest-facing switch ports untrusted. Other Answers B:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. The stronger recurring control is to audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. C:BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. Reducing this risk requires a practice to audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. D:Application visibility and control can distinguish sanctioned services that share common transport ports. Reducing this risk requires a practice to audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses.
Question 161An engineer connects a small unmanaged switch with a loop to an enterprise access port and causes unexpected spanning-tree topology changes. What should the engineer change first to meet these conditions? Define application-aware access policy with inspected services and segmented industrial destinations. Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection backed by trusted DHCP snooping bindings on appropriate VLANs. Use DHCP snooping with the uplink marked trusted and guest-facing switch ports untrusted. Protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. This action specifically works because bPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. Verify with: Inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. Other Answers A:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. The required change instead is to protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. B:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. A more relevant action is to protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. C:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. The corrective action for this requirement is to protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links.
Question 162An engineer connects a small unmanaged switch with a loop to an enterprise access port and causes unexpected spanning-tree topology changes. Which cause-and-effect relationship determines the best answer? BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. The practical corrective action is: Protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. Confirm it by: Inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. Other Answers B:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. In the stated system, BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. C:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. By contrast, BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. D:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. In the stated system, BPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes.
Question 163An engineer connects a small unmanaged switch with a loop to an enterprise access port and causes unexpected spanning-tree topology changes. Which observable result shows the correction is effective? Inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. Test a sanctioned management application and an unauthorized HTTPS tunnel against the policy and event logs. Connect a test rogue server to a guest port and confirm its offers are rejected while authorized offers succeed. Inject a forged ARP reply and confirm the untrusted access port drops it while legitimate learned clients communicate. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. The evidence confirms the intended action: Protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. It matters because bPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. Other Answers B:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. A more meaningful verification is to inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. C:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. The failure is checked more directly by a test to inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert. D:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. The relevant acceptance check is to inject a controlled BPDU on a PortFast edge port and check the expected protected state and alert.
Question 164An engineer connects a small unmanaged switch with a loop to an enterprise access port and causes unexpected spanning-tree topology changes. What should be institutionalized before future deployments? Maintain trusted uplink design and DHCP binding persistence across switch reloads. Apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches. Audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. Review application and identity policy after equipment and service inventories change. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches. This safeguard limits repeat failures because bPDU Guard can disable an access port receiving unexpected BPDUs, limiting unauthorized switching topology changes. The direct correction remains: Protect edge access ports with BPDU Guard and apply root-bridge controls to intended infrastructure links. Other Answers A:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. Reducing this risk requires a practice to apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches. C:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. A more direct preventive measure is to apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches. D:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. The stronger recurring control is to apply access-port templates and review exceptions before connecting third-party switches.
Question 165A laboratory's users and servers share a VLAN even though different users require different permitted destinations across buildings. What should the engineer change first to meet these conditions? Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection backed by trusted DHCP snooping bindings on appropriate VLANs. Classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. Define application-aware access policy with inspected services and segmented industrial destinations. Use DHCP snooping with the uplink marked trusted and guest-facing switch ports untrusted. ExplanationCorrect Answer B:Classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. This action specifically works because security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. Verify with: Move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. Other Answers A:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. This failure calls for a decision to classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. C:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. The corrective action for this requirement is to classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. D:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. The required change instead is to classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points.
Question 166A laboratory's users and servers share a VLAN even though different users require different permitted destinations across buildings. Which cause-and-effect relationship determines the best answer? Security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. ExplanationCorrect Answer A:Security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. The practical corrective action is: Classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. Confirm it by: Move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. Other Answers B:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. By contrast, security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. C:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. In the stated system, security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. D:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. In the stated system, security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address.
Question 167A laboratory's users and servers share a VLAN even though different users require different permitted destinations across buildings. Which observable result shows the correction is effective? Inject a forged ARP reply and confirm the untrusted access port drops it while legitimate learned clients communicate. Connect a test rogue server to a guest port and confirm its offers are rejected while authorized offers succeed. Move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. Test a sanctioned management application and an unauthorized HTTPS tunnel against the policy and event logs. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:Move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. The evidence confirms the intended action: Classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. It matters because security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. Other Answers A:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. Proving this correction calls for a check to move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. B:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. A more meaningful verification is to move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations. D:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. The failure is checked more directly by a test to move an authenticated test user between access switches and confirm identical permitted and denied destinations.
Question 168A laboratory's users and servers share a VLAN even though different users require different permitted destinations across buildings. What should be institutionalized before future deployments? Maintain trusted uplink design and DHCP binding persistence across switch reloads. Audit trunk and uplink trust flags so no ordinary edge port can serve DHCP responses. Review application and identity policy after equipment and service inventories change. Maintain ISE SGT assignment rules and SGACL change review when identity groups evolve. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Maintain ISE SGT assignment rules and SGACL change review when identity groups evolve. This safeguard limits repeat failures because security group tagging expresses identity/context-based access independent of a user's changing IP address. The direct correction remains: Classify identities into SGTs and enforce authorized SGACL policy at compatible policy enforcement points. Other Answers A:DAI validates ARP mappings against authorized IP-to-MAC bindings rather than accepting arbitrary ARP claims. The lasting safeguard is to maintain ISE SGT assignment rules and SGACL change review when identity groups evolve. B:DHCP snooping drops server responses received from untrusted ports before clients accept rogue leases. The stronger recurring control is to maintain ISE SGT assignment rules and SGACL change review when identity groups evolve. C:Port 443 alone does not identify the application or user and cannot substitute for policy context and threat inspection. A more direct preventive measure is to maintain ISE SGT assignment rules and SGACL change review when identity groups evolve.
Question 169A security estate has dozens of Secure Firewalls managed individually and configuration revisions drift between sites. What should the engineer change first to meet these conditions? Distinguish control-plane management from actual data-plane inspection and select the approved cloud management integration. Enforce management tenancy, role scoping and approval boundaries in the selected firewall management architecture. Implement documented privileged-account and logging controls based on an approved FTD hardening profile. Use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions. ExplanationCorrect Answer D:Use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions. This action specifically works because one central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices. Verify with: Compare policy version and deployed rules on multiple sites after one approved update. Other Answers A:Cloud-based centralized management does not by itself require all production packets to traverse the cloud console. A more relevant action is to use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions. B:Shared management without authorization separation risks cross-business configuration access. The corrective action for this requirement is to use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions. C:Hardened administration reduces abuse of management authority and improves traceability of security changes. This failure calls for a decision to use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions.
Question 170A security estate has dozens of Secure Firewalls managed individually and configuration revisions drift between sites. Which cause-and-effect relationship determines the best answer? Cloud-based centralized management does not by itself require all production packets to traverse the cloud console. Hardened administration reduces abuse of management authority and improves traceability of security changes. One central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices. Shared management without authorization separation risks cross-business configuration access. ExplanationCorrect Answer C:One central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices. The practical corrective action is: Use centralized multiddevice policy management with scope-aware inheritance and controlled exceptions. Confirm it by: Compare policy version and deployed rules on multiple sites after one approved update. Other Answers A:Cloud-based centralized management does not by itself require all production packets to traverse the cloud console. By contrast, one central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices. B:Hardened administration reduces abuse of management authority and improves traceability of security changes. In the stated system, one central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices. D:Shared management without authorization separation risks cross-business configuration access. In the stated system, one central policy manager improves consistency and auditability across managed inspection devices.