The digital underground economy has expanded in both scope and sophistication over the past decade. What was once a loosely organized space dominated by individual hackers using malware or basic phishing tactics has evolved into a complex, service-based ecosystem. One of the most notable and concerning developments is the emergence of initial access brokers. These cybercriminals specialize in the earliest phase of a cyberattack: gaining unauthorized access to enterprise environments. Once inside, they sell or lease that access to other attackers—ransomware operators, espionage groups, or financially motivated cybercriminals—who execute the next phases of the intrusion.
These brokers represent a professionalization of the cybercrime underworld. Rather than relying on end-to-end execution by a single threat actor, today’s cyberattacks are often split among several specialists. Initial access brokers handle the infiltration. Others manage lateral movement, data exfiltration, or extortion. This specialization enables higher efficiency, reduced risk for individual actors, and greater scalability for coordinated criminal campaigns.
Access is sold in various formats. It may be a login credential to a VPN, an exposed RDP endpoint, or administrative access to a cloud environment. Pricing varies depending on the organization’s size, industry, revenue, and network privileges offered. As a result, the underground forums where these sales occur now act as organized black markets for pre-compromised networks.
Remote Work and the Attack Surface Explosion
The explosion of remote work following the global COVID-19 pandemic dramatically widened the attack surface for threat actors. Enterprises scrambled to enable remote access and cloud collaboration, prioritizing business continuity over robust cybersecurity. In the rush, key protections were often overlooked. Remote Desktop Protocol and Secure Shell were exposed directly to the internet, frequently without multi-factor authentication or proper segmentation. These conditions were ideal for attackers searching for easy access vectors.
At the same time, cloud services like M365 became essential to organizational workflows. However, many cloud tenants were not configured with baseline security features enabled. A striking example is the absence of MFA on administrative accounts—a critical oversight. Surveys indicate that a large portion of cloud administrators have yet to implement MFA, making accounts vulnerable to basic password attacks and phishing.
Phishing techniques evolved to exploit this shift. One prominent method is OAuth phishing, which bypasses traditional credentials entirely. Instead of stealing usernames and passwords, attackers trick users into granting third-party apps overly permissive access to their accounts. Once granted, attackers may have read/write access to email, file storage, and calendars—all without raising security alerts.
These conditions made it easier than ever for brokers to obtain initial access at scale. Distributed workforces made network perimeter defenses less relevant. Meanwhile, inconsistently secured remote infrastructure provided ample opportunities for infiltration. This environment directly contributed to the growth and success of initial access brokers as key players in modern cybercrime.
Exploited Vulnerabilities in Remote Access Technologies
A major enabler of initial access has been the widespread exploitation of vulnerabilities in remote access technologies. Since late 2019, a continuous stream of critical vulnerabilities has been discovered—and actively exploited—in products from vendors such as Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Citrix, and F5.
Fortinet’s CVE-2018-13379, for example, allowed unauthenticated file reading on vulnerable VPN appliances. Pulse Secure’s CVE-2019-11510 enabled similar attacks. Citrix’s CVE-2019-19781 and multiple F5 BIG-IP vulnerabilities also granted attackers initial entry points without needing valid credentials. These flaws were often exploited by scanning tools and bots that rapidly identified unpatched systems across the internet.
Many organizations failed to patch promptly, even after the public disclosure of these vulnerabilities. As a result, attackers gained an easy advantage. Once an exploit was identified, brokers could quickly gain access, elevate privileges, and establish persistence using web shells or other malware. The access was then packaged and sold on cybercrime forums.
Microsoft Exchange servers also became a high-profile target, particularly during the 2021 exploitation campaign involving multiple zero-day vulnerabilities. Attackers compromised thousands of organizations globally by leveraging unpatched systems exposed to the internet. These attacks confirmed that even systems traditionally seen as internal could be repurposed as initial access points if improperly configured or updated.
These vulnerabilities served as the technological foundation for many modern breaches. Brokers use automated tools to identify and exploit them at scale. In turn, they offer this access to other groups, often with detailed descriptions of the entry point, privilege level, and affected systems.
Misconfigurations and Brute Force Tactics
Beyond software vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and brute-force attacks are common techniques used by initial access brokers. One of the most abused services is Server Message Block, a protocol for file and resource sharing. During Q1 2021 alone, over 14 million brute-force attempts were made against SMB services, accounting for nearly 70 percent of all exploit attempts in that period. The simplicity and effectiveness of this method make it an attractive option for attackers with minimal resources.
These attacks are automated. Threat actors deploy scripts and bots to test common passwords against exposed SMB, RDP, or VPN services. Weak password policies, credential reuse, and a lack of MFA make success likely. Even with password lockout policies in place, attackers often exploit timing gaps and low-and-slow brute-force methods to bypass detection.
Remote Desktop Protocol remains one of the most critical services exploited for initial access. Despite warnings from security agencies and researchers, many organizations still expose RDP to the open internet. According to threat reports, RDP was involved in 90 percent of ransomware attacks studied, and in 28 percent of cases, it was used specifically for initial access. In some instances, it was used only for internal movement after the initial breach.
The frequency of RDP brute-force attempts soared during the pandemic. In 2020, ESET tracked nearly 29 billion brute-force attacks targeting RDP—an increase of more than 700 percent year-over-year. This surge reflects both the demand for remote access and the lack of adequate defenses among organizations adapting to remote work.
Public cloud environments face similar issues. Misconfigured virtual machines, unprotected APIs, and overly permissive firewall rules have all created easy entry points. Attackers, including brokers, scan these environments continuously for exposed services. Once discovered, access can be harvested, consolidated, and monetized.
In many cases, organizations are unaware they’ve been breached. Initial access may go undetected for days or even weeks. During this dwell time, attackers evaluate the network, determine its value, and plan for resale or secondary exploitation. This delayed discovery increases the risk and impact of any attack that follows.
The Business of Initial Access Brokerage
Initial Access Brokers have become a well-defined part of the cybercriminal ecosystem, with their structure, incentives, and markets. What was once an informal activity practiced by opportunistic hackers has transformed into a systematic, organized, and often lucrative sub-economy. These brokers operate as suppliers in a broader supply chain, enabling ransomware gangs, espionage actors, and other financially or politically motivated groups to outsource the most labor-intensive part of an attack: gaining a foothold.
This arrangement benefits all parties involved. For ransomware operators, purchasing access eliminates the need to perform scans, test vulnerabilities, or phish credentials. They receive ready-made access, often with administrative privileges and mapped-out internal pathways. For the brokers, monetizing access quickly is ideal. The longer they hold onto access, the greater the risk of detection or patching. Speed is critical, and it has shaped the structure of this underground trade.
The transactional nature of initial access brokerage reflects market principles. Supply and demand dictate price, reputation influences trust, and platforms provide the infrastructure for communication, escrow, and dispute resolution. In short, this is not a fringe activity—it is a functioning underground business vertical.
Underground Forums and Marketplaces
The sale and trade of initial access typically take place on invite-only forums, private Telegram or Discord groups, and encrypted communication channels. Well-established underground forums offer listing sections specifically for access sales, where brokers post detailed advertisements. These include the name or type of the victim organization (often masked partially for discretion), access vector (VPN, RDP, Citrix, etc.), account privileges (user or admin), country, and sometimes even industry sector.
Some listings include screenshots as proof of access, while others may offer a demonstration to interested buyers. To reduce the risk of scams, many forums offer escrow services, where the buyer deposits the funds with a trusted middleman who releases payment once the access is verified. This system supports a reputation model, where reliable brokers develop credibility over time, commanding higher prices and attracting repeat customers.
The listings are competitive. Brokers try to outbid or out-market others by offering unique or high-value access. They may promise long-term persistence, help with lateral movement, or even assist in disabling endpoint detection solutions. The sophistication of offerings has grown, and in some cases, brokers run their access-as-a-service portals, offering web dashboards to select and purchase access in bulk.
Pricing Models and Value Drivers
The pricing of initial access varies widely depending on several factors. At the low end, access to small or poorly secured companies may cost as little as a few hundred dollars. On the high end, domain administrator access to a multinational corporation can sell for tens of thousands of dollars, especially if the buyer intends to deploy ransomware or engage in data exfiltration for blackmail.
Several variables influence price:
- Company size and revenue: Larger organizations are more likely to pay ransom or generate valuable data.
- Geographic region: Access to companies in wealthy countries commands a premium.
- Industry sector: Certain sectors, li,ke finance, healthcare, or critical infrastructure, are seen as more profitable targets.
- Privilege level: Access with administrative rights is far more valuable than that of a low-level user.
- Persistence level: Brokers who offer stable, undetected, and long-standing access can charge more.
- Access method: Fully authenticated RDP or VPN access is more valuable than a basic shell or web panel.
Auctions are also common. Some brokers start listings at a base price and allow multiple interested buyers to bid. This system can drive up the value quickly, especially for high-profile targets or rare types of access.
Relationships with Ransomware Gangs and Other Threat Actors
Initial Access Brokers often establish relationships with ransomware operators or threat actor groups, particularly those operating as part of a Ransomware-as-a-Service model. In this arrangement, ransomware developers partner with affiliates who are responsible for executing the actual attacks. Affiliates may prefer to buy access rather than perform initial infiltration themselves, and thus form informal partnerships or recurring arrangements with trusted brokers.
In some cases, brokers become semi-permanent suppliers for specific ransomware groups. These relationships are built over time and based on reliability and quality. Communication often takes place over encrypted platforms, and some brokers even receive a cut of the ransom payout as part of the agreement.
There is also evidence that certain advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, especially those associated with espionage campaigns, have used access provided by brokers. These state-linked actors may use access to pivot into politically sensitive organizations, governmental institutions, or technology firms. The brokers themselves may not always be aware of the buyer’s intent, especially when transactions occur anonymously through forums or intermediaries.
Regardless of the end use, the broker plays a pivotal role. Their ability to gain entry, remain undetected, and deliver usable access efficiently makes them a key enabler for more complex, resource-intensive cyberattacks.
Life Cycle of an Access Offering
The life cycle of a brokered access typically follows a structured path:
- Discovery: The broker scans the internet or cloud platforms for exposed services, misconfigurations, or vulnerable systems. They may also harvest credentials via phishing, infostealers, or data breaches.
- Validation: Once access is obtained, the broker confirms its stability and privilege level. Some go further by exploring internal systems to assess value.
- Packaging: The access is documented, screenshots taken, and listing details prepared. Metadata such as user privilege, internal IP ranges, and domain structure may be noted.
- Advertisement: The broker posts on underground forums or shares privately with known buyers. The post may include masked information about the organization, such as “US manufacturing company, 1,000+ employees, domain admin access.”
- Negotiation: Buyers respond, ask questions, or request more proof. If interested, they proceed via direct transaction or through escrow.
- Transfer: Once payment is received, the broker delivers access details. In some cases, they assist with initial login or provide notes on internal configurations.
- Follow-up: Some buyers request continued assistance, such as setting persistence mechanisms, disabling antivirus, or helping move laterally. Brokers may charge extra or include this as part of a premium offering.
Brokers often operate multiple listings at once. If an access point is discovered to be non-functional or has been patched, they may update the listing or replace it. Some maintain a reputation for prompt refunds or replacements, further legitimizing their business within underground communities.
Defensive Strategies Against Initial Access Brokers
Modern enterprise environments have grown complex, distributed, and heavily reliant on cloud technologies and remote access. This transformation has extended the traditional perimeter into personal devices, home networks, and third-party platforms. Unfortunately, this evolution has also created new pathways for attackers to gain a foothold. To defend against initial access brokers, organizations must first acknowledge that the threat is not hypothetical. Every exposed system, misconfigured cloud service, or unprotected login is a potential entry point—and brokers are actively searching for them.
Defense begins with awareness of the expanded attack surface. Remote Desktop Protocol endpoints, VPN gateways, insecure Wi-Fi configurations, unpatched operating systems, public cloud assets, and third-party SaaS tools all play a role. Any oversight in configuring these assets, such as default credentials, open ports, or insufficient authentication, increases risk. The fragmented nature of hybrid IT infrastructure makes it more difficult to enforce consistent security policies, but also more important.
Organizations must also view initial access as a foundational threat. Gaining entry is the first step in nearly every major breach. By stopping attackers at this stage, defenders can prevent ransomware deployments, data theft, and operational disruption before they occur. Effective protection strategies must combine people, processes, and technology in a holistic approach.
Core Mitigation Measures
Mitigating the risk posed by initial access brokers requires both proactive hardening and ongoing vigilance. Some of the most critical steps include:
Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): One of the most effective safeguards against unauthorized access is the universal deployment of MFA. This includes not only VPNs and RDP but also cloud services, administrative portals, and email accounts. MFA can prevent the use of stolen credentials, which are a common commodity for initial access brokers.
Limit Public Exposure of Services: Exposing services like RDP, SMB, or SSH to the public internet creates unnecessary risk. These should be restricted to internal networks or protected via jump servers, access brokers, or zero-trust solutions. Port scanning and brute-force attempts often target these protocols directly.
Patch Known Vulnerabilities Promptly: Organizations must monitor and apply patches for known vulnerabilities in widely used systems. This includes network appliances (e.g., Fortinet, Pulse Secure), webmail systems (e.g., Microsoft Exchange), and remote access tools. Delayed patching can leave systems open to attacks for months or even years.
Segment Networks and Restrict Lateral Movement: Implementing network segmentation and limiting user privileges reduces the impact of a breach. If a brokered access account cannot move laterally or escalate privileges, the value of that access decreases dramatically. Tools like firewalls, access control lists, and endpoint isolation help restrict movement.
Monitor Misconfigurations: Many cloud breaches stem from services left open or improperly secured. Regular audits using Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) tools or manual reviews can help identify misconfigured storage buckets, open APIs, or overly permissive user roles.
Enable Logging and Centralized Monitoring: Security logs from VPNs, RDP, firewalls, cloud services, and endpoints should be sent to a central location for correlation and analysis. Visibility into authentication attempts, account activity, and unusual access patterns is essential for early detection.
Threat Detection and Indicators of Compromise
Detecting the presence or activities of an initial access broker often involves identifying subtle indicators. Since brokers do not always deploy malware or cause immediate disruption, their presence can go unnoticed for extended periods. Some common indicators include:
- Unusual login times (e.g., midnight access from overseas IPs)
- Frequent failed login attempts from unknown or foreign locations
- Authentication from anonymization services such as Tor or commercial VPN providers
- Multiple logins across geographies that do not align with a user’s job function
- Presence of uncommon or unauthorized tools like Mimikatz, port scanners, or remote access clients
- Suspicious OAuth app approvals in cloud environments
- Unexpected firewall rule changes or open ports
- Installation of persistence mechanisms such as registry edits, new services, or startup scripts
Security operations teams should use Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), and User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) to correlate these signals. Proactive hunting for lateral movement, privilege escalation, or remote desktop activity on non-standard ports can surface broker activity early.
Integration with threat intelligence feeds also improves detection. Many brokers reuse infrastructure or tools linked to known actors. Blocklists of malicious IPs, hashes, and domains should be regularly updated and enforced at the network edge and email gateways.
Emerging Defensive Technologies and Strategies
In addition to traditional security practices, several modern technologies and strategies have proven effective in deterring or detecting initial access activity:
Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA): Unlike traditional VPNs, ZTNA enforces identity-based access on a per-application basis. Users must authenticate continuously, and no internal service is exposed directly to the internet. This approach limits visibility and opportunity for brokers and eliminates reliance on outdated perimeter defenses.
Security Posture Checks for Remote Devices: Before granting access, organizations can enforce posture validation checks such as antivirus status, OS patch level, or encryption enforcement. If a device fails the posture check, access is denied or quarantined until it complies.
Deception Technologies: These tools create decoy assets—fake credentials, honey accounts, dummy file shares—that act as early warning systems. If a broker or attacker stumbles upon them, the security team is alerted to a potential intrusion in progress.
Privileged Access Management (PAM): These systems enforce strict control over administrator credentials. Access is granted only for specific tasks and times, and all activity is logged. This minimizes the damage if a brokered admin account is compromised.
Continuous User Training and Phishing Simulations: Since phishing remains a popular method for harvesting credentials, user awareness is essential. Simulated attacks and education programs help employees recognize phishing and avoid credential leaks.
Security Scorecards and External Risk Ratings: Tools that assess an organization’s external exposure can provide early warning. These solutions scan public-facing infrastructure and cloud assets to identify what brokers might find valuable or vulnerable.
Incident Response Considerations
If a suspected initial access breach is detected, organizations should act quickly and decisively. First, revoke and rotate all potentially compromised credentials. Next, isolate affected systems and begin a forensic investigation to understand how access was gained and whether it was sold or transferred further.
Containment may involve taking services offline, resetting VPN configurations, and disabling RDP externally. Analysts should review historical logs for similar access patterns and check for persistence mechanisms that may have been installed. Engaging a professional incident response team may be necessary, particularly if lateral movement or data theft has occurred.
Organizations must also consider disclosure obligations. If data has been exposed or systems breached, regulatory reporting may be required. Post-incident reviews should result in updated policies, improved defenses, and better staff awareness.
The Road Ahead: Combating Initial Access Brokers
Initial access brokers have solidified their role as a major component of the cybercrime economy. Their emergence marks a shift from opportunistic intrusions to industrialized operations that can scale quickly and target a wide range of victims. This trend has become persistent rather than transient. As long as organizations continue to expose misconfigured, vulnerable, or unprotected systems, brokers will have the opportunity to sell access to the highest bidder.
The profitability of this underground market ensures that new actors will enter the space. Some will specialize in credential harvesting, others in exploiting remote services or public cloud assets. The low barriers to entry and high potential for earnings make this an attractive endeavor for cybercriminals with varying skill levels. This means the volume of available access listings will continue to grow, along with the diversity of targets and techniques.
The threat is also evolving in its tactics. Brokers are beginning to offer access through more sophisticated methods, including OAuth phishing, third-party software integrations, and abused APIs. As traditional services like RDP or VPN become harder to exploit due to improved defenses, attackers are pivoting to newer, less scrutinized entry points. This constant adaptation presents an ongoing challenge for defenders.
Shifting Toward a Resilience-Based Security Model
Defending against initial access brokers requires a philosophical shift in how organizations approach cybersecurity. Traditional strategies that focus solely on prevention are no longer sufficient. Instead, a resilience-based model is needed—one that emphasizes reducing impact, accelerating detection, and recovering quickly from compromise.
Resilience begins with reducing the time between intrusion and detection. Dwell time, the period during which attackers remain undetected, allows them to explore internal systems, escalate privileges, and prepare for monetization. Shortening this window through improved monitoring, behavioral analytics, and threat hunting is essential.
It also includes designing systems to fail gracefully. Microsegmentation, for example, ensures that even if one part of the network is breached, the rest remains insulated. Secure software development practices prevent attackers from pivoting through vulnerable apps or APIs. Least privilege access models ensure that stolen credentials cannot be used broadly across environments.
Finally, resilience means preparing for compromise. This involves having a tested incident response plan, regular backup validation, legal and compliance coordination, and clear communication strategies. Organizations that anticipate breaches and plan for them fare far better than those caught off guard.
Collaboration Between Industries and Governments
The fight against initial access brokers cannot be won by individual companies acting alone. Collaboration among industries, vendors, law enforcement, and governments is vital to reducing the scale and profitability of the access trade.
Governments and law enforcement agencies play a key role in disrupting access broker operations. Takedowns of forums, marketplaces, and hosting infrastructure can temporarily disrupt trade. Arrests of major operators serve as a deterrent, especially when high-profile cases are prosecuted. Intelligence-sharing between private sector firms and public agencies enables faster identification of emerging threats.
Industry coalitions are equally important. By forming alliances within sectors, companies can share anonymized breach data, indicators of compromise, and attack patterns without fear of reputational damage. These information-sharing initiatives can be formal (such as industry ISACs) or informal collaborations among trusted security teams.
Vendors also have a responsibility to reduce systemic vulnerabilities. Secure-by-default configurations, rapid patch releases, simplified security settings, and better education for administrators can all help reduce the number of exposed or misconfigured systems that brokers target.
Regulators can contribute by encouraging transparency and responsible disclosure. Breach notification laws, cybersecurity frameworks, and cloud security guidelines help raise the baseline level of defense across industries.
The Office of Access Broker Operations
Initial access brokerage is expected to grow in both volume and complexity in the years ahead. Future trends likely to shape this space include:
Automation and AI in Scanning: Brokers are increasingly using automation tools and artificial intelligence to identify vulnerable assets more quickly and efficiently. These systems can crawl the internet, scan for open ports, analyze metadata, and prioritize targets without human intervention.
More Sophisticated Evasion Tactics: As defenses improve, brokers will invest in evasion techniques. This includes custom malware that avoids detection, phishing kits that bypass email filters, and abuse of trusted services like single sign-on platforms or cloud APIs.
Access Chaining and Layered Sales: Brokers may begin to chain different types of access together, combining low-privilege credentials with known exploits to build high-value access paths. Some may sell access in stages, offering basic entry first and charging extra for deeper penetration.
Targeted Access Listings: Access offerings may become more tailored to specific buyer groups. Brokers might sell access exclusively to ransomware affiliates, APT actors, or financially motivated fraudsters, depending on the type of target and potential value.
Decentralized Markets and Escrow Alternatives: As law enforcement pressures centralized underground markets, brokers may shift to decentralized platforms or use cryptocurrencies and smart contracts to manage transactions without traditional escrow.
Broader Use of Compromised Identities: As digital identity becomes more central to modern business, brokers will exploit stolen identities not just for initial access but for impersonation, social engineering, and fraud. This includes compromised OAuth tokens, API keys, and identity federation accounts.
Building a Stronger Cybersecurity Culture
Ultimately, defending against initial access brokers requires more than just tools and policies. It demands a strong organizational culture centered on security awareness, accountability, and proactive defense. This includes:
- Embedding security in every layer of IT architecture
- Encouraging cross-departmental collaboration on risk
- Investing in security talent and continuous training
- Promoting clear communication during incidents
- Treating cybersecurity as a strategic business issue, not just an IT function
Security culture must be driven from the top. Executives need to set the tone by prioritizing cybersecurity in budgets, boardroom discussions, and strategic planning. When leadership champions security, the rest of the organization follows.
Final Thoughts
The emergence and rapid growth of initial access brokers represent one of the most significant evolutions in the cybercrime ecosystem over the past decade. These actors have professionalized the early stages of attacks, turning access into a commodity that fuels a wide range of threats—from ransomware and data theft to espionage and disruption. What makes this phenomenon particularly dangerous is its scalability, accessibility, and adaptability.
Organizations can no longer afford to treat initial access as a minor technical issue or an isolated event. It is the gateway to some of the most devastating cyberattacks and requires the same level of strategic attention as endpoint security, disaster recovery, or regulatory compliance. The increasing complexity of IT environments, combined with rapid digital transformation and the expansion of remote work, has dramatically expanded the attack surface. This creates fertile ground for brokers who seek to profit from every misconfiguration, outdated system, or overlooked credential.
The key to resilience lies not in eliminating all risk—which is impossible—but in reducing the opportunities available to adversaries. That means minimizing attack surfaces, enforcing strict access controls, responding quickly to anomalies, and preparing for the possibility of compromise. It also means building a cybersecurity culture that extends beyond the security team, engaging every employee, contractor, and vendor in the defense of digital infrastructure.
No single tool or policy can solve the problem. Instead, a layered defense strategy—supported by real-time monitoring, zero trust principles, cloud posture management, and continuous user education—provides the best chance of staying ahead of attackers. By understanding how initial access brokers operate and proactively disrupting their business model, defenders can tip the balance back in their favor.
As the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, one constant remains: the battle for the first point of entry. Winning that battle means staying vigilant, adaptive, and informed.