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The Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) was formed in response to escalating cyber threats to U.S. national security. Its mandate was clear: develop a strategic framework that ensures the resilience, security, and defense of America’s digital infrastructure. At the heart of the Commission’s work lies the understanding that cyberspace is not merely a technical realm but a central domain of geopolitical competition. Nation-states, criminal enterprises, and ideological actors all operate in cyberspace, often blurring the lines between crime, espionage, and warfare.

The report’s layered approach to deterrence reflects a new understanding of the multidimensional threat environment. Unlike traditional military domains, cyberspace includes a mix of state and non-state actors with varying capabilities. As a result, deterrence strategies must include not only government-led defense but also active roles for private companies and individual citizens. The concept of a “whole-of-nation” cybersecurity strategy stems from this reality and is a major advancement in strategic thinking.

Institutional Reform and the Modernization of Cyber Command

One of the most forward-looking recommendations of the Commission is the call to create a Major Force Program (MFP) for the United States Cyber Command. Historically, Cyber Command has operated as a subordinate element within broader defense programs, lacking the dedicated budgetary and organizational independence that other military branches enjoy. An MFP would fundamentally change this, giving Cyber Command greater control over its planning, resources, and strategic development.

This structural change is not merely bureaucratic. It recognizes that cyberspace operations are no longer ancillary but are increasingly central to U.S. defense capabilities. The traditional military assumption that cyber tools are merely “force enablers” is outdated. Today, cyber operations can serve as standalone tools for achieving strategic objectives, from disrupting enemy capabilities to gathering intelligence and signaling intent. The establishment of an MFP would enable Cyber Command to plan and operate as a full-spectrum force, accountable and capable in its own right.

In parallel, the Commission recommends reassessing the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and the Standing Rules for Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. forces. These doctrines govern when and how military personnel can respond to threats. Most were developed for kinetic conflicts and do not adequately cover the ambiguities of cyber conflict, where attribution is difficult, attacks are often covert, and responses must be both precise and proportionate. Updating these doctrines to reflect the realities of cyberspace is essential for an effective and lawful defense posture.

Legal Modernization: Expanding Defensive Capabilities

Another pivotal recommendation involves the amendment of the Pen Register Trap and Trace statute. This law, originally designed to govern the collection of signaling information (such as phone numbers dialed), has constrained private sector efforts to identify and trace back cyberattacks. Under the current framework, companies can detect intrusions but are often limited in how far they can pursue attribution or countermeasures. This puts defenders in a position of perpetual reaction, unable to fully understand or respond to the threats they face.

The Commission’s proposed changes aim to give organizations more legal room to engage in defensive measures that include tracing and analyzing attack infrastructure. This is a carefully calibrated move—it does not endorse offensive hacking but does allow deeper analysis that can support attribution, forensics, and collaboration with government agencies. By expanding what defenders are legally permitted to do, the government is effectively enabling a more proactive cybersecurity posture for the private sector.

However, legal reforms must be implemented with clear oversight and guardrails. The balance between enhanced capability and the risk of abuse must be carefully managed. Any expansion of defensive rights must be accompanied by clear accountability frameworks to ensure ethical and legal compliance.

Cybersecurity as a Shared Responsibility

A major theme of the CSC report is the idea that cybersecurity is not solely the responsibility of the federal government. Given that the majority of critical infrastructure in the U.S. is owned and operated by private companies, the success of any national cybersecurity strategy depends heavily on private sector participation. Yet, the report also acknowledges a persistent tension: while the private sector is expected to defend itself against high-end threats, it lacks the legal authority, financial resources, and intelligence support to do so effectively.

This creates a security paradox. The entities most targeted by cyberattacks—energy providers, financial institutions, technology firms—are the least equipped to counter advanced persistent threats from nation-state actors. In many cases, the cost of implementing top-tier cybersecurity measures is prohibitively high. Companies must weigh these costs against other business priorities such as competitiveness, innovation, and operational efficiency. As a result, cyber investments often fall short of what is needed to withstand sophisticated attacks.

The Commission attempts to address this imbalance through its layered deterrence model. This model includes three key components: shaping behavior in cyberspace, denying benefits to attackers, and imposing costs on adversaries. All three require coordination between public and private actors. For instance, shaping behavior requires common norms and standards, denying benefits requires resilient architectures, and imposing costs may include legal, financial, or even military responses.

Challenges of Economic Alignment and Incentivization

A recurring critique of the CSC report is its limited focus on economic alignment. While it outlines a strategic framework that includes the private sector, it does not go far enough in detailing how businesses can be economically supported or incentivized to adopt more robust cybersecurity measures. Without clear financial incentives—such as tax breaks, grants, or cost-sharing models—it is unrealistic to expect widespread adoption of nation-state level defenses.

Most companies do not lack awareness of the risks. What they lack is capital. The cybersecurity market is rich with tools, platforms, and expert services. However, access to these resources is constrained by budget limitations, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that make up a significant portion of the economy. Large multinationals may be able to absorb cyber investment costs, but smaller firms often cannot.

In the current environment, compliance mandates and breach reporting requirements are viewed not as enabling tools but as burdens. Companies must allocate resources to meet government regulations, leaving less budget for actual defense. This dynamic can lead to a zero-sum game where regulatory compliance comes at the cost of real security. To shift this equation, the government must do more to share the financial burden of cyber defense.

Tax incentives could be one mechanism. If cybersecurity investments were treated similarly to research and development (R&D) expenditures, companies might be more willing to prioritize them. Public-private funding partnerships could also help subsidize high-impact security initiatives. Additionally, cyber insurance markets could be stabilized and encouraged through federal backing, helping companies manage risk more effectively.

Evolving Threat Landscape and the Rise of Hybrid Adversaries

The cybersecurity threat landscape has evolved dramatically in recent years. One of the most troubling trends is the convergence of threat actor capabilities. Nation-state tools have leaked into the wild, empowering lower-skilled hackers with powerful exploits and surveillance capabilities. At the same time, nation-states are increasingly using criminal proxies, hacktivist fronts, and shell organizations to conduct cyber operations with plausible deniability.

This hybridization of threat actors makes attribution more difficult and responses more complex. A ransomware attack may be criminal in origin but supported by a nation-state intelligence service. A data breach may be conducted by non-state actors using military-grade tools. The lines between espionage, crime, and warfare are increasingly blurred, creating legal and strategic ambiguity.

In this context, the private sector’s traditional risk modeling is becoming obsolete. Organizations can no longer assume that sophisticated threats are only the concern of government agencies. Nation-state-level tactics are now being used against private firms, often with significant economic and operational consequences. The 2020 SolarWinds breach, for example, demonstrated how software supply chain vulnerabilities can be exploited to target hundreds of public and private entities simultaneously.

Yet, despite the clear and present danger, many organizations remain ill-prepared for this level of threat. The reality is that defending against a nation-state requires more than just firewalls and antivirus software. It requires intelligence sharing, coordinated response protocols, and advanced capabilities that are often out of reach for private firms operating independently.

The Path Forward: Empowerment Through Partnership

The CSC report correctly identifies the need for a whole-of-nation response, but this vision will only be realized if meaningful partnerships are developed. These partnerships must go beyond information sharing. They must include operational collaboration, financial support, and legal protection for companies that actively engage in national defense efforts.

Government agencies must view private companies not just as stakeholders or regulated entities, but as partners in defense. This requires trust, transparency, and mutual accountability. It also means rethinking traditional notions of sovereignty and defense in the digital age. When private companies are on the front lines of national security, they must be treated accordingly—with access to resources, protections, and strategic guidance.

Moving forward, the U.S. must adopt a more dynamic and inclusive cybersecurity governance model. This includes reforming legal statutes to allow defensive measures that go beyond passive monitoring, establishing economic incentives for cyber investment, and updating military doctrines to address the realities of cyber conflict. It also requires cultural change—within government, within industry, and society. Cybersecurity is no longer a technical issue; it is a strategic imperative that touches every aspect of modern life.

The Economic Pressure on Private Industry

Cybersecurity is not merely a technical discipline—it is an economic decision within the broader context of enterprise risk management. For many private organizations, particularly those operating under tight profit margins or within competitive global markets, cybersecurity represents a growing but often underfunded line item. The expectation that private companies will play a leading role in national cybersecurity defense, as suggested by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) Report, raises several economic challenges that have yet to be sufficiently addressed.

Private industry operates under the fundamental goal of profitability and survival. In practical terms, this means decision-makers must allocate limited budgets across a wide array of risks: operational disruptions, market volatility, legal compliance, supply chain instability, environmental concerns, labor disputes, tax policies, and now, more than ever, cyber threats. Cybersecurity competes for resources just like any other business function. While some industries like finance or healthcare have begun to prioritize cybersecurity more heavily, many others, including manufacturing, logistics, construction, and education, still treat it as a secondary or reactive priority.

The issue is further compounded by the intangible nature of cybersecurity investment. Unlike physical infrastructure upgrades or expanded production capacity, cybersecurity expenditures often do not result in visible returns. Security budgets are essentially designed to prevent something from happening rather than enabling something new. This prevention-based value model makes it inherently difficult to justify large expenditures unless the organization has already experienced a serious breach or faces stringent regulatory scrutiny.

Even among companies with a forward-leaning cybersecurity posture, there is a well-known limitation: most design their defenses with the most likely, not the most dangerous, threat actors in mind. They defend against the types of attacks they are most likely to face—not necessarily the worst-case scenarios. This approach, though practical in a business sense, leaves critical infrastructure vulnerable to advanced threats, particularly those emanating from nation-state adversaries with near-unlimited resources and strategic intent.

Misaligned Incentives and Risk Perception

A major theme in the current cybersecurity environment is the misalignment between national security imperatives and private sector incentives. For government agencies tasked with defending national infrastructure, every vulnerability in the digital ecosystem represents a potential point of failure. However, for a business, that same vulnerability is just one of many operational concerns. Without an immediate financial or reputational consequence, many organizations deprioritize cybersecurity relative to other pressing matters.

This misalignment is exacerbated by the often-uneven enforcement of regulatory requirements and industry standards. Some sectors, such as financial services, operate under heavy regulatory burdens that mandate robust cybersecurity practices. Others, like the technology startup ecosystem, may operate with minimal compliance obligations in their early years. The result is a fragmented and inconsistent national cybersecurity landscape—where some companies are over-regulated, others under-regulated, and the threat environment does not distinguish between them.

Moreover, cyber risk is frequently misunderstood or underestimated by organizational leadership. Boards and executives, while increasingly aware of cybersecurity threats, may still view them in abstract or oversimplified terms. Without clear threat intelligence, tailored risk assessments, or quantifiable metrics, cybersecurity may remain a technical issue relegated to IT departments rather than being elevated as a core strategic concern.

This structural gap in governance and understanding is especially dangerous given the evolving nature of threats. Attacks are no longer limited to data theft or denial of service. Increasingly, they target operational technology, industrial control systems, supply chains, and reputational trust. The economic damage from a major breach can be catastrophic, but unless organizations experience this firsthand—or see a close competitor suffer such consequences—they may continue to underinvest.

The High Cost of Defending Against Nation-State Actors

One of the most compelling insights from your commentary is the recognition that defending against nation-state actors is not merely difficult—it is, for many private organizations, economically unfeasible. Nation-state threats are characterized by persistence, sophistication, and a willingness to wait for the right moment. They often combine advanced malware with social engineering, insider access, and long-term reconnaissance. Defending against such threats requires a layered, intelligence-driven defense architecture that most private entities cannot afford.

A full-spectrum defense against nation-state cyber operations would typically require the following:

• Constant network monitoring and threat detection using behavioral analytics

• Threat intelligence subscriptions with real-time nation-state actor tracking

• Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with forensic capabilities

• Network segmentation and micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement

• Advanced identity and access management systems

• Continuous penetration testing and red team assessments

• Incident response teams are trained to counter advanced persistent threats.

• Legal and policy consultants to manage compliance, disclosure, and attribution

• Partnerships with government and sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)

The cost of maintaining such a posture—staffing, tools, consultants, legal support, and training—can reach millions of dollars annually. For large firms, especially in critical sectors, this may be a justified expense. But for the broader private sector, especially medium-sized enterprises, this level of investment is simply not feasible without government support or economic incentives.

Moreover, as the cyber battlefield becomes more complex, the cost-benefit ratio of defense continues to skew unfavorably. A well-resourced nation-state actor can conduct dozens of sophisticated intrusion campaigns at minimal cost. Meanwhile, defenders must protect every potential point of entry, 24/7, with highly specialized and often hard-to-find personnel. This inherent asymmetry puts defenders at a constant disadvantage.

Private Sector Expectations and the Call for Empowerment

Given the immense pressure placed on private industry to defend itself against increasingly capable adversaries, there is a growing call for empowerment. This does not simply mean information sharing or compliance checklists. It means giving companies the resources, authority, and legal protections needed to engage in the defense of cyberspace as full participants in national security.

The CSC report’s mention of enabling private sector participation is a start, but the recommendations are cautious and heavily tilted toward regulatory obligations. There is significant emphasis on breach reporting, data collection, and incident notification requirements. While these are important for national situational awareness, they place the burden squarely on companies without offering corresponding support.

To truly empower the private sector, the U.S. government must consider the following strategic shifts:

• Direct Financial Support: Rather than relying solely on compliance-driven behavior, the government could provide direct funding or grants to private sector entities—especially those operating critical infrastructure—for the development and maintenance of advanced cybersecurity capabilities.

• Tax Incentives: Treat cybersecurity investments as deductible expenses in the same way that research and development expenditures are incentivized. This would encourage companies to prioritize cybersecurity as part of long-term strategic planning.

• Legal Framework for Active Defense: While controversial, the concept of active defense—carefully defined and legally bounded—should be part of the national conversation. Companies facing repeated targeted attacks should not be legally prohibited from collecting intelligence on their attackers, provided they do so within a regulated environment that prevents escalation and collateral damage.

• Public-Private Threat Intelligence Fusion: While there are existing models of information sharing, these are often one-way, slow, or insufficiently granular. A more robust fusion of government intelligence and private sector telemetry could improve real-time defense.

• Incorporation into National Defense Planning: For sectors that represent strategic national interests—such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, and finance—private companies should have a formal role in national cyber defense planning and exercises. This goes beyond consultation; it means being embedded in the structures that determine response protocols, escalation thresholds, and strategic deterrence measures.

Regulatory Approaches: Burden or Benefit?

Regulation has long been a double-edged sword in cybersecurity. On one hand, it can set baselines for security practices and ensure accountability. On the other hand, if poorly designed or overly burdensome, it can divert resources away from actual defense. The CSC report suggests a regulatory framework that includes mandatory incident reporting and compliance with federal standards. These measures, while well-intentioned, may have unintended consequences if not paired with economic support.

Mandatory reporting, for example, may impose legal and reputational risks on companies. If not coupled with safe harbor provisions, firms may be reluctant to disclose incidents for fear of lawsuits, customer backlash, or regulatory penalties. Similarly, enforcing compliance with uniform security standards may not reflect the diversity of the threat landscape. A small healthcare clinic, a mid-sized manufacturer, and a multinational bank all face different threats, and security solutions must be tailored accordingly.

An ideal regulatory model should be risk-based, scalable, and outcome-oriented. It should set clear expectations while allowing companies the flexibility to meet them in ways that make sense for their risk profiles and operational models. Importantly, regulations must be seen not as ends in themselves, but as tools for enhancing resilience and preparedness.

The Strategic Value of Cyber-Ready Industry

A robust private sector cybersecurity posture is not just good for business—it is a strategic national asset. In a future conflict or crisis, adversaries will likely target both government and civilian infrastructure. From power grids and hospitals to transportation systems and communication networks, private entities will be on the front lines. The government cannot defend them all in real time. This makes the self-sufficiency and preparedness of private industry a matter of national security.

Moreover, the cyber capabilities developed in the private sector—whether through research, innovation, or operational expertise—can also serve as a resource for national defense. Companies often have cutting-edge technologies, security talent, and scalable infrastructure that can augment government efforts. The challenge lies in building the trust, frameworks, and policies to enable such collaboration without compromising privacy, civil liberties, or market competitiveness.

Investing in a cyber-ready industry is not charity; it is strategic foresight. The government spends billions annually on military preparedness, infrastructure, and disaster resilience. Cybersecurity should be no different. Private industry is not asking for a free ride—only for recognition that its role in national security comes with real costs and deserves real support.

Toward a Balanced Cybersecurity Ecosystem

To build a sustainable and resilient cybersecurity ecosystem, the United States must shift from a model of regulation and oversight to one of partnership and co-investment. The threats facing the nation in cyberspace are too vast, complex, and dynamic to be addressed by any single entity. Success depends on alignment of interests, sharing of responsibilities, and mutual investment in capability development.

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission laid a solid foundation for this vision. Its layered deterrence strategy acknowledges the role of all stakeholders—government, industry, and citizens. However, realizing this vision requires more than conceptual agreement. It demands action: funding mechanisms, legal reforms, cross-sector engagement, and a redefinition of national defense in the digital era.

Private industry is ready to contribute. But it needs more than directives—it needs tools, support, and trust. Only then can the United States truly achieve a resilient, secure, and united cyber defense posture.

The Legal Foundation of Cyber Operations in the United States

Cybersecurity in the United States is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and sector-specific laws. Unlike traditional domains of warfare or law enforcement, the legal foundation for cyber operations is fragmented and often outdated. Statutes that were created before the widespread adoption of the internet now struggle to address modern digital threats. This has created legal ambiguity not only for government agencies but also for private sector entities trying to defend themselves in an increasingly hostile cyber environment.

Two of the most significant federal laws that affect cyber defense are the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). While these laws were designed to protect networks from unauthorized access and ensure the privacy of communications, they also place strict limits on what private organizations can do when responding to cyber threats. For example, under CFAA, even probing a suspected attacker’s infrastructure without explicit authorization could be deemed illegal “unauthorized access.” Similarly, ECPA prohibits interception of electronic communications unless certain exceptions are met, limiting how defenders can collect threat intelligence beyond their network perimeter.

This legal structure effectively restricts the private sector to a “defense-only” posture. While companies can monitor, block, and remediate threats on their systems, they are legally barred from taking proactive or investigatory steps that extend beyond their boundaries. This creates an imbalance, especially when companies are being targeted by highly sophisticated actors using global infrastructure, anonymity tools, and geopolitical safe havens.

Active Defense: Between Legal Constraints and Operational Necessity

The concept of active defense, often referred to (incorrectly or controversially) as “hacking back,” is one of the most contentious areas in cyber policy. At its core, active defense refers to a range of actions that go beyond passive monitoring and perimeter protection. These can include tactics like beaconing, sinkholing, deception technologies, controlled counter-intelligence, and, in rare cases, attempts to disrupt or infiltrate attacker infrastructure for attribution or defense.

Proponents of active defense argue that current legal restrictions leave companies helpless against persistent and evolving cyber threats. In a landscape where attribution is difficult and where attackers can erase their tracks quickly, defenders need tools that allow them to engage adversaries more directly and gather real-time intelligence. Passive defense, they argue, is no longer sufficient. Cyberattacks are no longer isolated events; they are campaigns. If defenders are to disrupt these campaigns effectively, they need the legal authority and technical freedom to act beyond their firewalls.

Opponents warn of a slippery slope. Allowing private actors to engage in offensive or semi-offensive operations opens the door to misattribution, collateral damage, international escalation, and even retaliation against innocent third parties. There are also concerns about consistency and oversight. What if a company misidentifies the source of an attack? What if the infrastructure they target is shared with innocent parties? These questions form the basis of caution around expanding private sector powers in cyberspace.

Despite these risks, the status quo is increasingly seen as untenable. Nation-state attackers and well-resourced criminal groups operate with impunity, often shielded by legal jurisdictions that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement. In this asymmetric environment, defenders are outmatched not just by capability, but by law. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission report’s recommendation to amend the Pen Register Trap and Trace statute (5.2.3) is one of the first major efforts to carve out more room for lawful attribution and investigatory activity by private entities.

The Role of Government in Enabling Defensive Capabilities

While the private sector must be empowered, the government plays a central role in establishing the legal, operational, and ethical boundaries for cyber defense. In the current framework, only federal agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are authorized to conduct offensive cyber operations. These operations are governed by strict oversight rules, including presidential directives, congressional reporting requirements, and international law obligations.

The Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy and the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command reflect a growing recognition that cyber operations must be integrated into broader military planning. The recommendation in the CSC report to create a Major Force Program (MFP) for Cyber Command (6.1.1) is designed to give cyber operations more autonomy and visibility within the Pentagon’s budgeting and strategic framework. This is a critical step forward—but it also raises questions about how private sector capabilities and concerns will be integrated into military planning.

In practice, cyber threats do not neatly divide between public and private targets. A ransomware campaign might start with a private company but spread to critical public infrastructure. A supply chain attack might compromise both government agencies and corporate clients. In such scenarios, the boundary between national security and corporate risk is blurred. The government must therefore do more than just protect federal networks—it must enable and support defense across all sectors.

This requires a shift from a “command-and-control” model to a “collaborative defense model.” Under this model, public and private entities work together to develop threat intelligence, share operational capabilities, and coordinate response efforts. Legal mechanisms must be created to facilitate this collaboration without exposing participants to liability or privacy violations. Currently, many companies hesitate to share sensitive data with government partners for fear of regulatory exposure, public perception, or operational disruption.

Revisiting Standing Rules of Engagement and Use of Force

Another key recommendation in the CSC report (6.1.4) is the need to reassess and amend the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and the Standing Rules for Use of Force (SRUF) in cyber contexts. These rules, which guide military personnel on when and how to engage adversaries, were primarily designed for kinetic warfare. As such, they struggle to address the nuances of cyber conflict, including questions like:

• When does a cyberattack constitute an “armed attack” under international law?

• Can the U.S. respond to cyberattacks with kinetic force?

• What thresholds must be met before launching counter-cyber operations?

• How do proportionality and attribution standards apply in cyberspace?

In the absence of clear answers, many government agencies err on the side of caution, allowing cyber adversaries to operate without consequence. This caution is understandable, given the potential for unintended escalation. However, it can also lead to strategic paralysis. The U.S. must develop clearer thresholds, red lines, and policy doctrines that allow for a range of responses—diplomatic, economic, cyber, or kinetic—depending on the nature and severity of the attack.

These rules must also account for the role of private industry. If companies are on the front lines of national cyber defense, then the rules that govern response and engagement must be updated to reflect their realities. This includes defining when private sector actors can take action, how government agencies can support them, and what consequences will follow for adversaries who cross defined thresholds.

International Law and Cyber Norms

The issue of legal reform in cyberspace does not stop at national borders. Cyberspace is inherently transnational, and any legal framework must engage with international law and global cyber norms. The Tallinn Manual, developed by a group of international law experts, is one of the leading efforts to interpret how existing international law applies to cyber conflict. It provides a useful starting point but is not legally binding and lacks political enforcement.

There is currently no global treaty governing cyber warfare akin to the Geneva Conventions for kinetic conflict. Efforts at the United Nations to develop consensus on cyber norms have made slow progress, often hindered by geopolitical tensions and differing views on sovereignty, surveillance, and censorship. As a result, cyber conflict remains one of the least regulated forms of international engagement.

The United States must take a leadership role in shaping international cyber norms. This includes advocating for principles such as:

• Prohibition of cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure

• Ban on targeting hospitals, power grids, and water systems.

• Commitment to responsible vulnerability disclosure

• International cooperation in attribution and law enforcement

• Consequences for states that harbor or sponsor cyber criminals

Legal reform at the domestic level should be aligned with these international efforts. U.S. companies must be able to operate within a legal framework that is recognized and respected across jurisdictions. Similarly, U.S. cyber operations must be seen as lawful, proportionate, and accountable under international standards. This will require greater coordination between the Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of Defense, as well as international allies and partners.

Moving from Passive to Proactive Policy

A major criticism of current U.S. cyber policy is its predominantly reactive nature. Most laws and policies are designed to respond to breaches after they occur. Breach notification, incident reporting, and post-incident audits are essential, but they do not prevent attacks. A proactive policy approach would focus on preemptive measures, strategic deterrence, and forward defense.

The CSC report begins to move in this direction, especially with its recommendation to impose costs on adversaries. However, actual implementation has lagged. To move forward, the government should develop a proactive cybersecurity policy framework that includes:

• Pre-incident intelligence operations aimed at identifying and disrupting threat actors before they launch attacks

• Cybersecurity drills and red teaming that simulate advanced persistent threats across public and private sectors

• Cyber readiness certification that goes beyond compliance and focuses on real-world defense capabilities

• Forward deployment of cyber tools that can detect, disrupt, or degrade adversary infrastructure in real time

• Integrated cyber defense planning across agencies, sectors, and jurisdictions

Such a policy shift would require not only legal reform but also cultural change. Agencies and companies alike must embrace the idea that cybersecurity is not just about defending networks—it’s about shaping the digital battlefield to favor the defenders.

The Need for a Unified National Cyber Law

Given the fragmentation of current cyber laws, there is a growing call for a unified national cybersecurity statute—a comprehensive legal framework that consolidates and modernizes existing laws, defines roles and responsibilities, clarifies legal boundaries, and codifies acceptable practices in defense and response.

Such a law would serve several purposes:

• Simplify compliance for private entities by harmonizing conflicting laws and standards

• Clarify authority for government agencies in both offensive and defensive cyber operations

• Define legal boundaries for active defense measures by the private sector

• Create accountability structures for both public and private actors

• Codify data sharing protocols between industry and government

• Establish clear penalties for state and non-state actors who violate U.S. cyber laws

Crafting such a law would require bipartisan support, extensive industry consultation, and alignment with international norms. But its value would be immense. It would provide the clarity, consistency, and credibility needed to elevate the United States’ cybersecurity posture to a new level of strategic maturity.

Aligning Cybersecurity with National Defense Objectives

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) report makes a strong case for treating cybersecurity as a central pillar of national defense, equal in importance to conventional military readiness. As the digital realm becomes the arena for geopolitical competition, economic disruption, and societal manipulation, cyber capabilities—both defensive and offensive—must be fully integrated into the broader framework of national power.

This means moving from strategy to execution. Policies must be translated into programs. Vision must become doctrine. And most importantly, cybersecurity must be understood not just as a technical issue, but as a strategic imperative that cuts across all levels of government and sectors of the economy.

The “whole-of-nation” concept proposed by the CSC is essential here. It suggests that the burden of cybersecurity should not fall solely on federal agencies or military commands. Instead, responsibility must be distributed across federal, state, and local governments, private companies, academic institutions, and even individual citizens. However, shared responsibility must also mean shared support. For this collective model to work, the government must create a framework where participation is both enabled and incentivized.

Financial Incentives: A Cornerstone of Participation

One of the most effective tools available to the government is the power to influence economic behavior. Tax incentives, grants, matching funds, and subsidies have long been used to shape industry behavior in sectors such as energy, agriculture, and manufacturing. Cybersecurity deserves similar treatment, especially as it becomes a condition for national resilience.

Private industry does not need the government to tell it what to do; it needs help affording to do it. The private sector already knows the tools and services that can bolster their security posture. What’s missing is the capital to deploy those tools at scale.

A federal cybersecurity investment tax credit could allow companies to deduct expenditures related to hardware, software, personnel, training, and compliance. Such a program would encourage proactive investment, especially from small and mid-sized firms that might otherwise delay or forgo those improvements. A more aggressive approach could offer refundable tax credits, which would benefit firms that are not yet profitable but are nevertheless critical infrastructure providers.

Additionally, the government could establish a Cybersecurity Grant Program modeled after the Homeland Security Grant Program or the Defense Production Act Title III program. This fund could support sector-specific improvements, such as industrial control system modernization for utilities, secure software development practices in technology firms, or secure medical device networks in healthcare providers.

Financial support must also account for recurring costs. Cybersecurity is not a one-time investment but a continuous operational requirement. Budgeting support, in the form of annual subsidies or low-interest loans, could help companies manage ongoing costs for managed security services, cyber insurance, and employee training.

Leveraging Market Incentives Through Procurement and Insurance

Another way to operationalize cybersecurity policy is to use the government’s purchasing power to drive market behavior. Federal agencies spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually on goods and services. By embedding cybersecurity criteria into procurement contracts, the government can effectively create a market-wide baseline.

For example, vendors seeking to sell products or services to the federal government could be required to meet specific cybersecurity maturity levels, undergo third-party audits, or demonstrate participation in threat intelligence sharing programs. This would not only raise the standard for government-facing contractors, but also create economic pressure for vendors to improve their security in order to remain competitive.

Cyber insurance is another powerful lever. The federal government could work with insurance providers to standardize risk models, create shared threat data repositories, and provide backstops for catastrophic events. Just as federal disaster relief supports communities hit by hurricanes or wildfires, a federal cyber reinsurance program could help stabilize the cyber insurance market, encourage broader adoption, and drive risk-reducing behavior through premium incentives.

Such policies could also include public recognition mechanisms like cybersecurity ratings or labels for consumer products and services, akin to Energy Star or UL safety ratings. These labels would create transparency for buyers, reward secure development practices, and put pressure on companies to meet established security baselines.

Enforcing Deterrence and Accountability

In cybersecurity, deterrence is fundamentally about convincing adversaries that the cost of attacking will outweigh the benefits. Traditional deterrence strategies rely on credible threats of retaliation and denial of success. In cyberspace, both approaches are more complex due to attribution difficulties, international legal constraints, and varying norms around escalation.

However, a credible deterrence framework remains essential. The U.S. must develop a policy architecture that blends the following:

• Persistent engagement: This refers to continuous operations in cyberspace that disrupt adversary planning, degrade their capabilities, and impose friction. These efforts, often led by Cyber Command, are about shaping the behavior of adversaries in advance, rather than reacting after damage is done.

• Attribution transparency: Publicly attributing cyberattacks to nation-state actors or criminal groups is important for shaping norms and building diplomatic coalitions. The U.S. must continue to lead global efforts in attribution, backed by intelligence disclosures, coordinated announcements with allies, and legal indictments.

• Legal accountability: Using indictments, asset seizures, travel bans, and economic sanctions, the U.S. can impose direct consequences on identified actors. This toolbox should be expanded and deployed more systematically, especially when attacks involve critical infrastructure or public services.

• Kinetic and non-kinetic response options: In extreme cases, cyberattacks may warrant responses beyond the digital domain. While escalation must be carefully managed, it is important to maintain a credible spectrum of options—including diplomatic expulsions, trade restrictions, and even military operations—when cyberattacks constitute acts of war or terrorism.

Deterrence must also include domestic enforcement. Cybercrime prosecutions, corporate accountability for negligence, and regulatory enforcement actions all send signals that cybersecurity is not optional. These actions must be transparent, consistent, and commensurate with the harm caused. They should also be complemented by safe harbor provisions that encourage disclosure and cooperation rather than silence and avoidance.

Breaking the “Defense-Only” Paradigm

Perhaps the most controversial and under-discussed issue in operationalizing national cybersecurity is the legal and practical limitation placed on private industry: the defense-only paradigm. As currently constructed, laws and norms generally prohibit private actors from engaging in any actions that could be construed as offensive, investigative, or retaliatory beyond their own networks.

This puts companies in a uniquely vulnerable position. They are the targets of increasingly advanced and persistent attacks, but they are not allowed to trace, attribute, or disrupt the sources of those attacks without government intervention. The amendment to the Pen Register Trap and Trace statute, as proposed in the CSC report (5.2.3), is a small step toward correcting this imbalance, but it is not enough.

To move beyond the defense-only paradigm, the U.S. must define and enable a category of authorized active defense, governed by oversight, transparency, and safeguards. This category could include activities like:

• Attribution engagement, where companies collect information about attacker infrastructure or behavioral patterns across public networks

• Deception technologies, such as honeypots and decoys, used to draw attackers away from real systems

• Collaborative counter-intelligence, where multiple organizations share telemetry to identify common threats and tactics

• Preemptive sandboxing, where suspected malicious code or file types are executed in controlled environments for analysis

These activities do not constitute “hacking back,” and they should not involve destructive or disruptive actions against third-party systems. However, they would allow companies to move from passive defenders to informed participants in national cyber defense efforts.

Creating this framework would require close coordination between the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense, as well as Congressional legislation. It would also require input from civil liberties advocates to ensure that privacy and due process rights are preserved. But without this shift, the private sector will continue to operate at a structural disadvantage.

National Campaigns and Public Engagement

One underutilized area of national cybersecurity strategy is public education and cultural engagement. Just as past generations were taught civil defense procedures during the Cold War, today’s society must be educated on cyber hygiene, personal security practices, and the broader geopolitical implications of cyber conflict.

Cybersecurity must be normalized as part of everyday civic life. Campaigns should aim to:

• Raise awareness of phishing, social engineering, and digital fraud

• Promote the use of strong authentication, password managers, and encrypted communications

• Encourage software updates, backups, and device security

• Build community norms around reporting suspicious behavior and incidents

• Clarify the role of citizens and small businesses in national resilience

This effort should also include education in schools and universities, workforce development programs for cybersecurity roles, and certifications for practitioners. The government must lead by example, but the message must reach the general population. Cyber resilience cannot be confined to a handful of technical experts—it must be part of the national fabric.

Final Thoughts

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission report has succeeded in laying a broad foundation for national cybersecurity strategy. It recognizes the scale of the threat, the need for structural reform, and the importance of public-private collaboration. However, vision alone is not enough. The real challenge lies in operationalizing this vision—through laws, budgets, partnerships, and cultural change.

Cybersecurity must be treated not as a compliance issue or an IT function, but as a national defense priority. This means investing in the private sector as a co-defender, not just regulating it as a risk. It means creating legal frameworks that support proactive defense while preserving civil liberties. It means holding adversaries accountable in meaningful and public ways. And it means building a resilient digital society where every citizen, company, and institution plays a role.

There is no single solution, and no final victory in cybersecurity. But there is a path forward—one that blends deterrence with resilience, incentives with enforcement, and strategy with execution. The time to walk that path is now.